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Abstract
Single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs) are a practical option for space-based quan-
tum communications requiring single-photon detection. However, radiation damage to
SPADs significantly increases their dark count rates and thus reduces their useful lifetimes
in orbit.
For Space-QUEST experiment, I analyzed the feasibility of using silicon SPADs inside
the International Space Station for a 1-year mission. Adding a 1-year contingency margin
and taking sample variations into account, Excelitas SLiK SPADs need to be cooled down to
−45 ◦C and Excelitas C309021SH −65 ◦C to guarantee the dark count rate below 2000 Hz.
In the first round of laser annealing tests, we show that high-power laser annealing of
irradiated SPADs of three different models (Excelitas C30902SH, Excelitas SLiK, and Laser
Components SAP500S2) heals the radiation damage and several SPADs are restored to
typical pre-radiation dark count rates. Of nine samples we test, six SPADs were thermally
annealed in a previous experiment as another solution to mitigate the radiation damage.
Laser annealing reduces the dark count rates further in all samples with the maximum dark
count rate reduction factor varying between 5.3 and 758, depending on the sample and the
radiation dose, when operating at −80 ◦C. This indicates that laser annealing is a more
effective method than thermal annealing. The illumination power to reach these reduction
factors ranges between 0.8−1.6 W. Other photon detection characteristics, such as photon
detection efficiency, timing jitter, and afterpulsing probability, fluctuate but they are not
sufficient enough to impact the overall performance of quantum communications. These
results herald a promising method to extend the lifetime of a quantum satellite equipped
with SPADs.
We then perform the second round of laser annealing tests. This starts off with radiation
simulation to determine radiation dosages of different lifetimes in space for radiation test
performed on Laser Components SAP300s. After proton irradiation, the samples from
each damage group are laser-annealed using the same method in the first round of laser
annealing tests (60 s continuous exposure) and the results show that they all recover the
dark count rate close to the pre-radiation values at 22 ◦C. The optical power to achieve
such reduction is between 800−1000 mW. In addition, we explored new laser annealing
vii
methods in order to learn about the causes of the laser annealing effect. We show that the
180 s continuous exposure and 50% duty cycle method for 60 s exposure can also return
the dark count rate to pre-radiation levels when the average illumination power is between
800−1000 mW. These results imply that the thermal effect is the main contributor of
laser annealing. However, we also show that forward-bias current annealing on one sample
and its dark count rate drops at a much faster rate per power deposition than other laser
annealing methods. As a result, more tests need to be done to investigate the causes of
the laser annealing effect further. Furthermore, we find that the improvement from laser
annealing is permanent.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the Information Age is progressing, we need to transfer more and more information
through the Internet and between mobile devices. As a result, we have to develop faster
processors and communication systems. Gordon Moore [1] projected that the number
of transistors on an integrated chip would double every two years, thereby increasing the
processor speed. Creating more dense chips leads to the development of smaller transistors,
but there is a fundamental limit to how small a traditional metal-oxide-semiconductor field-
effect transistor can be [2]. Thus, researchers are exploring alternative designs as we are
headed for the limit. Another solution of increasing the processing speed is to develop
quantum computers. Richard Feynman in 1982 [3] came up with the idea of using the
advantages of quantum mechanics to create a computer. Our modern communication
systems and computers use logical bits ‘0’ and ‘1’. A logical bit is deterministic so it has to
be either ‘0’ or ‘1’. However, a quantum bit, or qubit, has the property of superposition that
makes the qubit probabilistic, that is, it is p percent ‘0’ and (1-p) percent ‘1’, where p is
controllable. Using this superposition principle, n qubits represent information equivalent
to 2n classical bits. Thus, the quantum computer can outperform the modern classical
computer when a quantum processor with a sufficient number of qubits is developed.
The quantum computer gained a global attention when Peter Shor, then at Bell Labs,
developed a quantum algorithm that can factor out a product of two very large prime num-
bers and solve discrete logarithm problems [4]. Unfortunately, current public-key crypto-
graphic protocols, such as RSA [5], Diffie-Hellman [6], and elliptical curve [7, 8] encryption
schemes, can be easily and completely broken by Shor’s algorithm if we have a quantum
computer now. This is a big problem because the security of every application or system –
including online banking and shopping, e-mails, ATM, text-messages, and etc. – that relies
on the aforementioned public-key encryption systems is in jeopardy. On the other hand,
1
Grover’s search quantum algorithm [9] can be used to attack symmetric key encryption
systems. The algorithm is capable of finding a solution from 2n samples with a high prob-
ability by iterating it at most 2
n
2 times. For example, Grover’s algorithm can be executed
at most 264 times to find the secret key for AES-128 [10], reducing the security measure by
half. Dr. Michele Mosca postulated a theorem to raise awareness of these security threats
[11]. According to the theorem, let x be the number of years the cryptographic keys need
to remain secure. Let y be the number of years to update current infrastructure or deploy
new systems to achieve quantum-safe network. Let z be the number of years it takes to
develop the quantum computer that breaks the security. If x + y > z, we need to worry
because information can no longer be protected for the promised x years. Therefore, we
need to come up with quantum-safe solutions that can be deployed soon.
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [12, 13]
are two quantum-safe solutions. PQC is improved upon current classical cryptography.
RSA [5], Diffie-Hellman [6], and elliptical curve [7, 8] public-key encryption schemes can be
replaced by lattice-based (i.e. learning with errors [14]), multivariate [15, 16], or isogenies
[17] public-key encryption systems. Symmetric key encryption systems, such as AES,
need to double the key size to remain secure against quantum attacks, such as Grover’s
algorithm. PQC schemes are easy to deploy on the current infrastructure as they are simply
computer algorithms. They are efficient because the key size does not need to be as long as
the message. However, PQC does not have any security proofs, so there may be a loophole
to break these new PQC schemes. Historically, cryptanalysis was able to defeat many
cryptosystems [18]. On the other hand, QKD guarantees unconditional security based
on quantum physics. In QKD, a communicating party (Alice) uses a random sequence
of bits to encode a series of qubits by two randomly selected orthogonal bases with equal
probability. She then sends the qubits to the other communicating party (Bob). During the
transmission, the eavesdropper cannot completely copy the transmitted qubits due to no-
cloning theorem [19] and she cannot determine which basis was used to encode each qubit
due to Heisenberg’s uncertainty theorem [20]. When the eavesdropper attempts to perform
either copying or measuring of qubits, she can introduce errors in the received qubits,
revealing her presence. After two communication parties extract a shared, secret key from
qubits, they perform one-time pad encryption, which is the only secure encryption method
proven by Claude Shannon [21], or other symmetric key encryption schemes. Drawbacks
of one-time pad encryption scheme are that the key size must be as long as the message
itself and the key must be used only once, so it is not as efficient as PQC counterparts.
Other symmetric key encryption schemes can give up some security for improved efficiency
while security confidence is still better than PQC. A disadvantage of QKD is that the
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QKD network requires additional infrastructure. Therefore, the main trade-off between
PQC and QKD is the security confidence and cost.
There are great efforts to build global QKD networks. Visible to near-infrared single-
photons are used as qubits for the speed at which information is carried between two
communicating parties, for long enough coherence time to preserve the encoded states
during transmission, and for the availability of low-loss channels. Optical fibre-based [22–
24] and quantum satellite-based [25, 26] networks are two potential solutions researchers
are pursuing for a global connection. The optical fibre-based network has an advantage
of using optical fibres already installed for classical communications links. However, the
optical fibre has a relatively high intrinsic loss, limiting the distance for a single link for
QKD. In addition, if the quantum channel is multiplexed with other classical channels, the
quantum signals are buried in noise caused by Raman scattering. Thus, the development
of the quantum repeater [27] and multiplexing methods are inevitable to establish a global
network. Unfortunately, inventing the quantum repeater is as difficult and challenging
as creating the quantum computer, so it is not a viable option for a global connection
yet. However, Europe [28], China [29], Korea [30], Japan [31], U.K. [32], Switzerland
[33], and U.S. [34–36] have built or are building metropolitan or nation-wide optical-fibre-
based quantum networks. On the other hand, the quantum satellite in low-Earth-orbit is
a feasible technology today for a global QKD network because the satellite technology is
mature and because the free-space link is mostly in vacuum. The geometric loss of the
free-space link grows quadratically with distance, while the optical fibre’s absorption loss
grows exponentially with distance. Various feasibility studies [37–41], ground tests [42–49],
ground-to-air [50–52] and ground-to-satellite experiments [53–61] were performed by re-
searchers from China, Germany, Austria, U.S., Canada, Japan, Italy, U.K., and Singapore.
China successfully launched a quantum satellite in 2016 and proved that satellite-based
QKD is indeed feasible [61]. In addition, China also showed that ground-to-satellite Bell’s
inequality test (via entangled photons) [62] and quantum teleportation experiment [63] are
successful. These results are significant because more satellites can be launched into space
to form a satellite constellation, and Bell’s inequality test and quantum teleportation can
help us establish the global-scale quantum Internet.
For ground-to-satellite quantum communications, the satellite can be designed as either
a transmitter or a receiver. For instance, China launched its satellite as a transmitter and
Canada is building it as a receiver [64]. Both designs have advantages and disadvantages
but for building a quantum satellite network, it is necessary to research on both designs for
inter-satellite communications. An external factor that needs to be considered for building
a receiver satellite is radiation damage in low-Earth-orbit. The most popular single-photon
3
detector for free-space link is silicon Single-Photon Avalanche photoDiode (SPAD) for its
high efficiency, its spectral response curve overlapping with the transmission window in
the atmosphere, and no need for cryogenic cooling. However, studies [65, 66] show that
proton radiation damages on silicon SPAD result in a significant increase in the background
noise. When the noise exceeds a certain threshold, it is not possible to perform quantum
communications protocols [67]. Thus, the satellite lifetime is limited by how long the noise
can stay below the threshold. For radiation damage mitigation, metal shielding can block
protons to slow down the damaging process and heating up silicon SPAD with its built-in
thermoelectric cooler (TEC) can anneal silicon lattice and thus reduce the background noise
[68–70]. Other alternatives that can suppress the noise further can prolong the lifetime of
the quantum satellite.
In this thesis I present experimental investigations of the effects of high-power laser
annealing on irradiated silicon SPADs as a solution to proton radiation damage mitiga-
tion. The samples were irradiated by 106 MeV protons with various fluences to simulate
different lifetimes in space. Some of these samples were previously thermally annealed
in another experiment [70], so the first round of laser annealing experiment focused on
whether laser annealing is effective on decreasing the background noise and whether laser
annealing can reduce the noise further after thermal annealing. The second round of laser
annealing experiment performed a full cycle of radiation simulation, radiation test, and
laser annealing procedure to directly check whether the background noise is returned to
the pre-radiation values. Then, we attempted to explore the causes of the laser annealing
effect with respect to the peak temperature produced on irradiated silicon SPAD, total
exposure energy, and excess carrier flow. To investigate the excess carrier flow further,
forward-bias current annealing was performed on one sample. Lastly, three samples were
characterized for 58−59 hours after each laser annealing power to verify whether the effect
is permanent. Before delving into the experimental results in Chapter 6-8, background
information is explained throughout Chapter 2-5.
Chapter 2 goes over three quantum communications protocols: Bell’s inequality test,
quantum teleportation, and QKD. Chapter 3 goes over the history of free-space QKD
experiments that led up to the launch of the quantum satellite. Chapter 4 illustrates how
a silicon SPAD and various quenching circuits operate, while Chapter 5 discusses radiation
damage in space, how to calculate it, and radiation test results on silicon SPADs. Chapter
6 analyzes the feasibility of using silicon SPADs insde the International Space Station for
Space-QUEST experiment based on the radiation test results from Chapter 5. Chapter 7
and 8 show experimental results and the analysis of laser annealing of irradiated silicon
SPADs. I conclude in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2
Quantum Communications
2.1 Introduction
Quantum communications may replace the current communications network backbone for
unconditional security. Bell’s inequality test, quantum teleportation, and Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) are three important quantum communication primitives for establish-
ing a quantum network. Bell’s inequality test [71–73] experimentally verifies the validity
of entangled photon pairs that can be used for quantum teleportation and entanglement-
based QKD. Using the entangled pairs, quantum teleportation [74] sends an unknown state
from one place to another. This protocol is imperative for the development of the quantum
Internet. QKD ensures the generation of unconditionally secure key for encrypting confi-
dential messages and there are two different implementation styles [12, 13]. These three
quantum communications protocols are explained further in the following sections.
2.2 Bell’s inequality test
In 1935, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen’s thought experiment [75]
demonstrated through quantum entanglement1 that the quantum mechanics theory is in-
complete, if explained by a classical physics theory. They concluded that there should
be local hidden variables theory to complete it. However, Bell’s theorem [71] mathemati-
cally proved that local hidden variables cannot fully explain the quantum mechanics. This
1“Quantum entanglement is a quantum mechanical phenomenon in which the quantum states of two
or more objects have to be described with reference to each other, even though the individual objects may
be spatially separated.” [76]
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Figure 2.1: Bell’s inequality test experimental setup (Reprinted from [73]). S
is an entangled state 1√
2
(|HH〉 + |V V 〉). |H〉 (|V 〉) is a horizontally (vertically) polarized
single-photon state. a and b are H/V basis polarization beam splitters. a (b) can be
rotated by 0◦ (22.5◦) or 45◦ (67.5◦).
means that local realism2 does not apply to quantum physics at all times, unlike classical
physics. John F. Clauser, Michael A. Horne, Abner Shimony, and Richard A. Holt (CHSH)
generalized Bell’s theorem for an experiment proposal in 1969 [72]. Alan Aspect simplified
the experiment further [73] and used Fig. 2.1 to test local hidden variables theory with
entangled photons and linear optics.
The goal for this experiment is to calculate the correlation value S (Eq. (2.1)), where
a, b, a’, b’ represent H/V basis polarization beam splitter rotated by 0◦, 22.5◦, 45◦, and
67.5◦, respectively, and E(x,y) is a correlation function. (N+− in Eq. (2.2) represents the
number of coincident detection events, measuring +1 at a side and −1 at b side3.) If there
are local hidden variables, |S| ≤ 2 [72]. This inequality was generalized by CHSH from
Bell’s original inequality. However, entangled pairs violate such inequality, indicating that
local hidden variables theory cannot explain the quantum mechanical phenomena. The
maximum value each correlation function can obtain is 1√
2
. Thus, the maximum S value
is 2
√
2, violating |S| ≤ 2.
S = E(a, b) + E(a′, b) + E(a′, b′)− E(a, b′) (2.1)
E(a, b) =
N++ +N−− −N+− −N−+
N++ +N−− +N+− +N−+
(2.2)
For quantum communications, entangled photons are required for quantum teleporta-
tion and entangled-based QKD protocols. These protocols will fail if the prepared photon
2Locality means that two objects that are far apart cannot affect each other instantly, while realism
means that an object already has a pre-determined value before a measurement.
3+1: horizontal polarization, -1: vertical polarization
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pairs are not sufficiently entangled. Therefore, the main purpose of Bell’s inequality test in
quantum communications applications is to verify the quality of entangled photon sources.
2.3 Quantum teleportation
Quantum teleportation [74] transfers an arbitrary qubit (|φ〉 = α |0〉 + β |1〉) from point
A to point B using classical information and pre-shared entangled states between two
communicating parties. This quantum communication primitive is crucial in establishing
the quantum Internet.
Prior to sending an arbitrary state, the two communicating parties need to share an
entangled state 1√
2
(|0〉a |0〉b+|1〉a |1〉b). Then, Alice prepares an arbitrary state α |0〉c+β |1〉c
and performs a Bell state measurement4 with the arbitrary state and a qubit from the
entangled pair. Three-qubit state can be written in the following manner:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(α |0〉c + β |1〉c)(|0〉a |0〉b + |1〉a |1〉b) (2.3)
=
1√
2
(α |0〉c |0〉a |0〉b + α |0〉c |1〉a |1〉b + β |1〉c |0〉a |0〉b + β |1〉c |1〉a |1〉b) (2.4)
=
1√
2
[(α |0〉c |0〉a + β |1〉c |0〉a) |0〉b + (α |0〉c |1〉a + β |1〉c |1〉a) |1〉b] (2.5)
=
1
2
[α(|φ+〉ac + |φ−〉ac) + β(|ψ+〉ac − |ψ−〉ac)] |0〉b (2.6)
+
1
2
[α(|ψ+〉ac + |ψ−〉ac) + β(|φ+〉ac − |φ−〉ac)] |1〉b (2.7)
=
1
2
|φ+〉ac (α |0〉b + β |1〉b) +
1
2
|φ−〉ac (α |0〉b − β |1〉b) (2.8)
+
1
2
|ψ+〉ac (β |0〉b + α |1〉b) +
1
2
|ψ−〉ac (α |1〉b − β |0〉b) (2.9)
The modified three-qubit state shows that Alice can measure one of four Bell states with
equal probability. Depending on the measured Bell state output, the qubit at Bob’s side
changes into the arbitrary input state with a phase difference and/or flipped states. This
state is the same as Alice’s input state with 1
4
probability, so Bob needs to perform simple
corrective operations to obtain the same arbitrary state Alice prepared (α |0〉c + β |1〉c) at
all times. The information on the order of and types of operations is sent from Alice via
4This measurement can distinguish four Bell states: |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉), |φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉),
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉).
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a classical channel by monitoring the classical outputs (bit string ‘ab’) of the Bell state
measurement5. If a=1 (b=1), Z (X) operation is performed on Bob’s qubit.
|0〉 =
[
1
0
]
|1〉 =
[
0
1
]
X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
Bell state measurement
Classical Channel
Qubit operations
Figure 2.2: Quantum teleportation (Reprinted from [77]).
After these operations, Bob’s qubit is the same as Alice’s input state every time. Fig-
ure 2.2 summarizes the procedure.
2.4 Quantum key distribution
Two main categories of QKD schemes are the prepare-and-measure and entanglement-
based protocols. For prepare-and-measure protocols, a communicating party (Alice) pre-
pares quantum states and transmits them to the other communicating party (Bob) for
measurement. For entanglement-based protocols, a third-party source sends a qubit from
entangled pairs to Alice and Bob, and they perform measurements independently on each
qubit.
2.4.1 Prepare-and-measure scheme
The very first prepare-and-measure QKD scheme (BB84 6) was proposed by Charles Ben-
nett and Gilles Brassard in 1984 [12]. Two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, share
a quantum channel for transmitting qubits and an authenticated classical channel7 for the
5|φ+〉 : 00, |φ−〉 : 10, |ψ+〉 : 01, |ψ−〉 : 11
6The protocol name, BB84, is named after the first letter of their last names and the year the paper
was published.
7A secure classical channel established between Alice and Bob. It cannot be tampered with but can
still be overheard.
8
Figure 2.3: BB84 QKD protocol (Reprinted from [78]).
public communications needed to extract the final secret key after the key exchange. The
‘quantum part’ of QKD is therefore only the initial qubit distribution and the following
procedures are all performed classically.
The full BB84 QKD protocol works as follows. Alice and Bob use polarized photons for
encoding bit ‘0’ and ‘1’, and for security, two non-orthogonal basis are randomly selected
for encoding. Rectilinear basis constitutes horizontal (bit ‘0’) and vertical (bit ‘1’) polar-
izations, while diagonal basis includes +45◦ (bit ‘0’) and −45◦ (bit ‘1’) polarizations. Alice
randomly and independently selects a bit value and a basis for encoding a photon. The
encoded photon is then transmitted in a quantum channel to Bob who randomly chooses
either rectilinear or diagonal basis for qubit measurement and records his basis choice and
output polarization/bit value. The shared key between Alice and Bob is called raw key.
After a raw key is established, Alice and Bob each publicly announce via the authenticated
classical channel which basis was used to encode and measure each photon. For each bit,
Alice and Bob only keep the bits when they used the same basis. The resulting key is called
sifted key. Subsequently, Alice and Bob reveal a portion of the sifted key for correcting
any errors in the remaining key using error correction algorithms. If the error rate exceeds
a certain threshold (typically ≤ 11%), Alice and Bob abort the operation and start anew.
Otherwise, the error-corrected, sifted key is shortened by a hash function to further reduce
possible information leakage to the eavesdropper. This process is called privacy amplifi-
cation and the final, shortened key is called secret key. Alice and Bob use it to encrypt
messages.
The unconditional security of this protocol relies on the no-cloning theorem that quan-
9
tum states cannot be duplicated completely without inducing error. Rectilinear and diago-
nal basis are not orthogonal, so, for example, if a horizontally polarized photon is measured
in the diagonal basis by the eavesdropper, she obtains either +45◦ or −45◦ polarization
with equal probability. If Bob chooses the rectilinear basis for measuring the resulting
photon after the eavesdropper’s measurement, he equally likely obtains a horizontally or
vertically polarized photon, instead of getting a horizontally polarized photon with 100%
probability. This induced error by the eavesdropper informs Alice and Bob of her presence
during error correction stage.
2.4.2 Entanglement-based scheme
Prof. Artur Ekert independently invented another QKD scheme in 1991 [13]. This scheme
utilizes polarization-entangled photon pairs during qubit distribution stage instead of pre-
pared states at Alice, and extra Bell’s inequality test guarantees the unconditionally secure
key distribution in addition to no-cloning theorem.
Ekert’s QKD scheme utilizes the singlet state8 and sends each photon to Alice and
Bob. Alice and Bob each have independent H/V basis polarization analyzers and they are
randomly and independently rotated by φa1 = 0, φ
a
2 = pi/4, or φ
a
3 = pi/2 at Alice’s side, and
by φb1 = pi/4, φ
b
2 = pi/2, or φ
b
3 = 3pi/4 at Bob’s. After passing through the analyzers, the
input singlet state changes to the following state9:
1√
2
[sin(φa − φb)(|H〉a |H〉b + |V 〉a |V 〉b) + cos(φa − φb)(|H〉a |V 〉b − |V 〉a |H〉b)] (2.10)
After the qubit distribution phase, Alice and Bob publicly announce selected analyzer
rotation for each photon. If the rotation angles are the same10, Alice and Bob include the
bit in the raw key. Bob flips his bit value because the singlet state is anti-correlated. If
they selected different angles11, Alice and Bob also publicly announce the output value
(±112) to calculate the correlation value (S) for Bell’s inequality.
8 1√
2
(|H〉a |V 〉b − |V 〉a |H〉b) = 1√2 (|D〉a |A〉b − |A〉a |D〉b), |D〉 = |+45◦〉 , |A〉 = |−45◦〉
9If Alice and Bob use the same analyzer, they will always get anti-correlated measurement values.
Otherwise, they get correlated values with the probability of |sin(φa−φb)|
2
2 and anti-correlated values with
the probability of |cos(φa−φb)|
2
2 .
10(φa2 , φ
b
1), (φ
a
3 , φ
b
2)
11(φa1 , φ
b
1), (φ
a
1 , φ
b
3), (φ
a
3 , φ
b
1), (φ
a
3 , φ
b
3)
12+1: horizontal polarization, -1: vertical polarization
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If the Bell’s inequality is violated, Alice and Bob can confirm that the received photons
were entangled. Furthermore, they can confirm that there was no eavesdropper in the
quantum channel because, for the eavesdropper to gain information, she needs to measure
the incoming photons and send new photons to Alice and Bob. However, measuring a
photon of an entangled pair breaks entanglement, causing the Bell’s inequality test to fail.
Therefore, the Bell’s inequality test adds the security verification to entanglement-based
QKD. The subsequent error correction and privacy amplification processes are the same
as the prepare-and-measure scheme.
2.5 Conclusion
Since the security threat for classical encryption algorithms due to the development of the
quantum computer is a major issue and Bell’s inequality test and quantum teleportation
can be tested on QKD infrastructure, quantum communications applications focus more
on QKD. The ultimate goal for researchers around the world is to build the global-scale
quantum communications network to provide quantum-safe solutions everywhere. Fibre
optics and free-space paths are two quantum channels for photons. Fibre optics have much
higher intrinsic loss and quantum repeaters [27] are still in the development phase. Con-
structing a quantum satellite is another solution for the global connection. This technology
is feasible as China recently launched a quantum satellite and successfully demonstrated
the operation of Bell’s inequality test [62], quantum teleportation [63], and QKD [61] with
ground stations over >1000 km apart. The next chapter describes how initial 32 cm long
free-space QKD experiment [79] advanced to the operation of a quantum communications
satellite.
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Chapter 3
Quantum Satellite
3.1 Introduction
The first full BB84 experiment was implemented in 1992 by Bennett et al. [79] over 32 cm
free-space channel using polarization encoding. This proved that implementing Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD) is not an unrealistic task and started to attract researchers to
the field of QKD. In this chapter, I begin with early free-space experiments following [79],
some of which already suggested a ground-to-satellite network for a global QKD connection.
Following these recommendations, several groups around the world conducted detailed the-
oretical feasibility studies of quantum satellite [37–41]. Researchers also improved optical
and other processing systems to extend the working distance to over 100 km for Bell’s in-
equality test, quantum teleportation, and QKD [42–49]. Next, airplanes, a hot air balloon
as a mock-up satellite, and retro-reflectors on satellites were used to experimentally verify
the feasibility of ground-to-air/ground-to-satellite QKD with a moving object [50–52, 54–
56, 58, 59]. Finally, Chinese research groups confirmed that ground-to-satellite quantum
communications are indeed possible with their quantum satellite [61–63].
3.2 Initial free-space QKD experiments
Six research papers [25, 26, 80–83] published after the free-space QKD experiment by
Bennett et al. [79] gradually improved the QKD systems to transmit photons over longer
distances and some of these mentioned the possibility of a ground-to-satellite connection
for QKD. Table 3.1 summarizes the results from the papers.
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Table 3.1: Summary of six early free-space QKD experiments and their per-
formance. For QKD distance, if a cell has only 1 value, it means that distance applies
to both daytime and nighttime. Noise filtering refers to filtering of background photons
from the Earth, Sun, and moon. TX: Transmitter, RX: Receiver, P2P: point-to-point,
G2S: ground-to-satellite, QBER: quantum bit error rate, JHU: Johns Hopkins University,
LANL: Los Alamos National Laboratory, LMU: Ludwig-Maximilian University.
[80] [25] [26] [81] [82] [83]
Year 1996 1998 1999 2000 2002 2002
Protocol BB84 B92 B92 B92 BB84 BB84
TX & RX
locations
Collocation Collocation P2P P2P P2P P2P
Noise
filtering
spectral,
spatial,
temporal
spectral,
spatial,
temporal
spectral,
spatial,
temporal
spectral,
spatial,
temporal
spectral,
spatial,
temporal
spectral,
spatial
Distance
(day/night)
75 m/150 m -/950 m 0.5 km 1.6 km/- 10 km -/23.4 km
Raw key
rate
- 50 Hz
50000
detection
events
-
1349 Hz
(daylight)
1.5−2 kHz
Secret key
rate
1 kHz - - 3 kHz
264 Hz
(daylight)
few
hundred
Hz
QBER 2% 1.5% 0.4% 5.3% 3.2% <5%
G2S QKD
feasibility
prediction?
No Yes Yes No No Yes
Research
Institute
JHU LANL LANL LANL LANL LMU
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Based on their results, W. T. Buttler et al. [25] and R. J. Hughes et al. [26] from Los
Alamos National Laboratory estimated Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER)1 in nighttime
and daytime between a ground station and a satellite at 300 km altitude. They predicted
that ground-to-satellite QKD would be feasible at nighttime and maybe even in daylight
if a very narrow spectral filter is employed. In addition, if the ground station is configured
as a transmitter, they predicted the generation of a raw key rate of 250 Hz with a 10 MHz
source.
C. Kurtsiefer et al. [83] from Ludwig-Maximilian University also predicted the possi-
bility of ground-to-satellite QKD. Their QKD system could handle up to 27 dB in poor
visibility. They estimated that if the receiver efficiency increases from 15%, the system
could tolerate loss greater than 33 dB. At this loss, the authors believed that ground-to-
satellite QKD in the range of 500−1000 km is feasible.
3.3 Feasibility studies
After the early free-space QKD experiments, a few theoretical studies [37–41] on the fea-
sibility of quantum communication with satellites were published. The studies relied on
simulations and the main focuses of them were atmospheric transmission window selection,
satellite configurations, signal wavelength selection, and link attenuation analysis.
Atmospheric transmission window selection depends on atmospheric absorption and
turbulence, diffraction, and commercially available lasers and single-photon detectors. At-
mospheric absorption is caused by various molecules, such as Ozone, carbon dioxide, and
water, blocking radiation at various wavelengths. The atmospheric transmission win-
dow of our interest is between 400−1600 nm because the only commercially available
single-photon detectors for quantum communications are silicon-based and InGaAs/InP-
based Single-Photon Avalanche photoDiode (SPAD), photomultiplier tubes and single-
photon superconducting nanowires. Silicon-based SPADs are sensitive at 400−1100 nm,
while InGaAs/InP-based SPADs and superconducting nanowire detectors are suitable for
1300−1600 nm [84, 85]. Photomultiplier tubes are sensitive in the visible to near-infrared
range. Figure 3.1 shows the atmospheric transmission window of our interest and that
choosing higher wavelength can reduce atmospheric absorption [41].
Currently, the performance of single-photon detectors narrows down the transmission
window even further. InGaAs/InP-based SPADs have ∼10% efficiency and a high dark
count rate (false photon counts) for 1300−1500 nm [84–86]. Superconducting nanowires
1QBER needs to be ≤11%.
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Figure 3.1: Atmospheric transmission window (Reprinted from [41]). Coloured
vertical lines show a few selections of commercially available laser wavelengths.
have higher efficiency but they require cryogenic cooling, making it difficult to equip them
on satellites. Photomultiplier tubes have 10−40% photon detection efficiency in the visible-
near-infrared range , while thick-junction silicon SPADs have peak photon detection effi-
ciency of 50−70% between 600−800 nm and a very low dark count rate. Silicon SPADs
have the best performance, do not need cryogenic cooling, and are reliable, so these fea-
sibility studies [37–41] all selected the signal wavelength between 600−800 nm and used
photon detection efficiency and dark count rate of silicon SPADs in their calculations.
Atmospheric turbulence occurs in the lower 20 km of the atmosphere and is caused by
the change in the refractive index due to temperature variations [41]. It leads to beam
wandering and broadening, and scintillation. These effects can be reduced at higher signal
wavelength [39–41]. Fortunately, turbulence does not affect polarizations [87].
Diffraction also contributes to transmission loss. It depends on the signal wavelength,
transmitter telescope size, and the link distance [41], because the loss comes from the
receiver telescope missing a portion of the incoming beam. Thus, to reduce diffraction-
induced loss, either the diffraction angle should be minimized or the receiver telescope
size increased. Following the diffraction equation (Eq. (3.1)), where DT is the transmitter
telescope aperture size, the angle can be reduced if either the wavelength is decreased or
the transmitter telescope size is increased.
DT sin(θ) = λ (3.1)
Transmittance due to diffraction in far field can also be roughly estimated using Eq. (3.2),
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given that the transmitter telescope is diffraction-limited and that the transmitter and re-
ceiver telescopes are perfectly aligned and have no intrinsic losses [39].
Tdiffraction ≈ D
2
TD
2
R
L2λ2
(3.2)
The telescope apertures at both ends and signal wavelength can be optimized to compen-
sate for the loss, but its gain is limited because satellites have mass restrictions, limiting
the telescope sizes.
In summary, a longer wavelength would decrease losses from atmospheric absorption
and turbulence, while shorter wavelength compensates for diffraction loss. This becomes
important when choosing the signal wavelength in the 600−800 nm range for different
satellite configurations.
Two satellite configurations are possible for space-based quantum communications [38,
41]:
1. Ground station: signal encoding. Satellite: state analyzer and single-photon detec-
tors. (Uplink)
2. Ground station: state analyzer and single-photon detectors. Satellite: signal encod-
ing (Downlink)
Uplink and downlink configurations utilize one-way communication scheme, so the
transmitter prepares either weak-coherent-pulses2 or single photons. An advantage of the
uplink setup is that the source type can be easily swapped for different experiments while
the advantage of the downlink is faster key rate due to lower link loss.
Each configuration has a different main source of loss. For uplink transmission, atmo-
spheric turbulence loss dominates over diffraction loss because the optical signals trans-
mitted from a ground station encounter atmospheric turbulence in the first 20 km so the
divergence angle is larger than that from diffraction. Figure 3.2 shows that turbulence is
the main source of loss for uplink transmission because increasing the transmitter telescope
size beyond 40 cm does not improve the link attenuation. It contradicts Eq. (3.2) and thus
implies that diffraction is not the dominating factor. Since turbulence is the major source
of loss, a longer signal wavelength is preferred.
For downlink transmission, diffraction is the main source of loss. Signals are affected
by atmospheric turbulence in the last 20 km of the optical path, which is less than 10%
2Highly attenuated coherent light pulses such that the number of photons per pulse follows the Poisson
distribution.
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Figure 3.2: Transmission link attenuation (Reprinted from [39]). Left: uplink
transmission, Right: downlink transmission. Signal wavelength is 800 nm. DT : transmit-
ter telescope aperture, DR: receiver telescope aperture, TT : transmitter telescope trans-
mission factor, TR: receiver telescope transmission factor, Lp: pointing loss, ro: Fried
parameter. The Fried parameter is used only for uplink transmission to estimate the effect
of atmospheric turbulence over the entire optical path [40].
of the entire length. Thus, atmospheric turbulence causes less significant divergence. Fig-
ure 3.2 shows that increasing the transmitter telescope size does improve the transmission
efficiency, indicating that diffraction is the major problem. A shorter signal wavelength
should be selected for the downlink transmission to reduce the diffraction angle.
The factors that contribute to the overall communication loss are taken into account for
link analysis. For the analysis, the telescope size equipped on a satellite is assumed to be
10 cm diameter, while that for the ground station is selected to be 30 cm diameter for uplink
and 1 m diameter for downlink [38]. Using 650 nm signal wavelength and weak-coherent-
pulses, the link attenuation for 1000 km is 34 dB for uplink and 24 dB for downlink. As a
result, the downlink QKD can share a raw key at a faster rate than the uplink [37–39, 41].
3.4 Impact of dark counts on quantum communications
The goal for ground-to-satellite QKD is to extract a secret key over a single pass (∼300 s)
[39]. The asymptotic secret key rate depends on the transmission loss, alignment error,
single-photon sources, QBER, single-photon detectors’ efficiencies, and its dark counts
[47]. To overcome the overall transmission loss, a faster source clock rate and a higher
detection timing resolution could be implemented. For a longer secret key generation per
pass, it is also important to have low QBER not to waste many keys during the error
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Table 3.2: Effect of higher dark counts in the detectors on the key generation
and on the maximum distances of fundamental experiments. Wavelength 785 nm,
50 cm transmitter and a 30 cm receiver. Orbit 600 km, pointing error 2 µrad and rural
atmosphere (5 km visibility) at sea level. Source rate: 300 MHz for weak-coherent-pulses
(WCP) and 100 MHz for entangled photon source; detection time window: 0.5 ns. Table
and caption are reprinted from [41].
Detector
dark
(cps)
WCP source
key (Mbit per
month)
Entangled source
key (Mbit per
month)
Max. Bell test
distance (km)
Max. teleportation
distance (km)
20 3.222 0.440 1359 683
100 3.109 0.426 1283 660
1000 2.292 0.322 1039 0
10000 0 0.012 660 0
correction stage and not to exceed the operation abortion threshold of 11%. In practice,
a lower QBER threshold value could be used if the operators know the possible ranges of
QBER fluctuations with the absence of the eavesdropper. Dark counts occur randomly,
so as shown in Table 3.1, a narrow detection window (∼1 ns) could be applied only when
incoming single photons are anticipated to decrease the chance of measuring an erroneous
value in the window. The dark counts play a critical role in a QBER calculation. If they
increase, QBER can also increase. Thus, it is important to analyze how high dark counts
can degrade the performance of QKD.
Table 3.2 from Bourgoin et al. [41] shows how high dark counts impact the secret key
generation rate for QKD and the maximum operational distances for Bell’s inequality test
and quantum teleportation. QKD with weak-coherent-pulses can produce a secret key for
dark counts up to ∼1000 cps, while QKD with entangled photons and Bell’s inequality
tests can operate up to 10 000 cps dark counts with reduced performance. Quantum tele-
portation can work with dark counts up to ∼100 cps. Therefore, selecting single-photon
detectors with very low dark counts and high efficiency is as important as optimizing equip-
ment choices for link analysis of ground-to-satellite quantum communication channel. This
analysis becomes important in Chapter 5.
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Figure 3.3: Experimental setup for free-space QKD over 144 km (Reprinted from
[42]). Polarization encoding is used for this experiment, so each of four laser produces hor-
izontal, vertical +45◦, and −45◦. The pulses are coupled into a single-mode fibre and then
collimated at the exit of the telescope. Decoy states are generated by randomly selecting
two laser diodes. The pulse width is 2 ns with the repetition rate of 10 MHz. 850 nm
wavelength is chosen. The receiver uses a passive basis choice BB84 polarization analyzer.
The half-wave plate before the analyzer is placed to compensate for any polarization ro-
tation in the receiver telescope. For pointing and tracking system, two-way beacon lasers
are monitored on charged-coupled device cameras to optimize the link efficiency. For time
synchronization, the transmitter clock signal is synchronized with the receiver’s to perform
sifting. 10 Mbps Internet was used as a classical channel.
3.5 Ground-based experiments
Researchers in Europe performed free-space QKD using weak-coherent-pulses and entan-
glement sharing over 144 km between the Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife [42, 43].
The atmospheric distance for this link is longer than that between a low-Earth-orbit satel-
lite and a ground station, so the experiments were in realistic settings for confirming the
feasibility of quantum satellite technology.
The QKD experiment using the scheme in Fig. 3.3 was performed at night time but
extra filtering was added to reduce the background counts. The receiver telescope had a
variable iris to limit the spatial mode and only photon counts detected within the 5.9 ns
window were included in the raw key string. Under good weather conditions, 28 dB link
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loss was observed. 10 dB was from atmospheric loss, 14 dB from diffraction, and 4 dB from
the transmitter telescope efficiency. In addition to 28 dB loss, the detector efficiency added
6 dB more. With ∼1 kHz dark count rate and 34 dB overall loss, the secret key rate of
12.8 bps with 6.48% QBER could be achieved. 3% of QBER came from the background
counts, 3% from alignment errors, and 0.5% from the polarization analyzer.
At the same location, Ursin et al. [43] also tested polarization-entangled photons shar-
ing between Alice and Bob. Alice replaced her weak-coherent-pulse source with a 710 nm
Type-II energy-degenerate spontaneous parametric down-conversion. The output state was
as follows:
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉A |V 〉B − |V 〉A |H〉B) (3.3)
Alice also had the same polarization analyzer as Bob and polarization compensations
were included before both polarization analyzers to ensure the reference frame of incoming
photons were well maintained. The rest of the setup is the same as that from Fig. 3.3.
They obtained the value of S = 2.508± 0.037, violating the inequality by 13 standard
deviations and proving that the photon pairs were indeed entangled. Using the entangled-
photon pairs, they also demonstrated QKD. For 75 s measurement time, 789 coincident
counts could be detected, producing the secret key rate of 2.37 bps with QBER of 4.8%.
Researchers from the Europe experimentally confirmed the feasibility of downlink quan-
tum communication. Furthermore, they utilized these entangled sources and low-noise
single-photon detectors to perform quantum teleportation experiment between La Palma
and Tenerife [88]. Their results proved that ground-to-satellite quantum teleportation is
feasible.
Researchers in China performed quantum teleportation and quantum entanglement dis-
tribution also for downlink configuration [46]. A scheme for quantum teleportation had
Alice and Charlie placed next to each other and Bob 97 km away from them across a lake.
Charlie generated polarization-entangled state, |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|HH〉 + |V V 〉), and sent one
photon to Bob. Alice randomly generated one of horizontal, vertical, +45◦, −45◦, clock-
wise circular, anti-clockwise circular polarizations and performed a Bell State Measurement
(BSM) with the other entangled photon. For detection system, spatial, spectral, and tem-
poral filtering were incorporated to reduce the background light. The total link loss varied
between 35−53 dB depending on the weather condition across the lake. Quantum telepo-
ration experiments lasted for four hours and the fidelity of the six states varied between
76-89%, averaging to 80%, which exceeds the classical limit of 2/3 [89].
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For entanglement distribution experiment, Charlie was placed between Alice and Bob.
The distance between Alice and Charlie was 51.2 km, between Bob and Charlie was 52.2 km,
and between Alice and Bob was 101.6 km. Charlie generated the same |φ+〉. Total link
loss of both channels combined varied between 66−85 dB, averaging to 79.5 dB, which
was close to typical loss of 75 dB when a satellite at 600 km altitude uses 20 cm diameter
transmitting telescope and both optical ground stations use 1 m diameter telescopes. They
distributed entangled pairs for 32 000 s and obtained the correlation value of S = 2.51±0.21,
successfully violating the Bell’s inequality.
Dr. T. Jennewein and his team at the University of Waterloo (UW) in Canada, on
the other hand, are interested in developing a quantum satellite for uplink configuration
[45, 47]. The plan is to launch it in 600 km heliosynchronous orbit, with a simulated
total link loss for 785 nm signal wavelength, 25 cm diameter transmitting telescope, and
30 cm diameter receiving telescope with an imaginary optical ground station at Ottawa,
Ontario, Canada [45, 47]. The best satellite pass is when it travels directly above the
ground station but it does not happen every time, so they simulated for 75th percentile of
all passes occurring in a year [47]. The link loss then varied between 40−50 dB and they
experimentally verified whether QKD system can tolerate such high loss and still generate
secure keys using the setup in Fig. 3.4.
In a proof of concept QKD experiment, 256 pseudo-random bits were repeated for 1000 s
and only sifting was performed as post-processing [45]. They obtained secure key rate at
57 dB losses, which includes 6 dB receiver loss. At 57 dB total loss, a secure key rate of
2 bps could be obtained when the source was clocked at 76 MHz repetition rate, showing
that the key exchange is feasible between a ground station and a satellite receiver.
In a following experiment [47], full post-processing procedure was implemented and the
receiver design was improved for testing the feasibility of secret key rate generation with
total loss between 28.8−56.5 dB. The receiver loss was reduced to 4.5 dB, so the maximum
link loss was similar to the previous experiment and everything else was the same. The new
receiver design in Fig. 3.5 used a passive choice polarization analyzer because active basis
choice added another complexity to the receiver design as it required time synchronization.
After sifting the raw key, error correction and privacy amplification were newly added in
this experiment to extract the secret key that are actually used in encryption schemes. The
asymptotic secret key rate of 0.5 bps was achieved with 56.5 dB total loss, confirming the
feasibility of uplink configuration. The performance could be improved if high wavelength
could be chosen to reduce the loss due to atmospheric turbulence effects.
Using the full uplink QKD setup, the UW research team also implemented a tracking
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Figure 3.4: Experimental setup for an uplink configuration feasibility test
(Reprinted from [45]). 532 nm signal pulses are generated by up-converting a 810 nm
mode-locked laser with 76 MHz repetition rate and a 1550 nm continuous-wave laser. The
output pulses have the mode-locked laser’s repetition rate and short pulse width while
their polarizations and intensities are controlled by the continuous-wave laser. The output
signal wavelength is also converted to 532 nm. The signal pulses are then coupled into a
single-mode fibre and collimated by a 3 in lens. This lens’ position is adjusted to vary the
diverging angle to simulate for different channel losses experienced at the receiver. The
receiver uses an active choice BB84 polarization analyzer. The half-wave plate chooses the
basis. The single-photon detectors have photon detection efficiency of 48% at 550 nm and
the dark count rate of ≈20 Hz. The receiver causes additional 6 dB loss.
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Figure 3.5: New satellite receiver design for uplink (Reprinted from [47]). In
addition to changing the basis choice to passive, the new receiver incorporates spatial,
spectral, and temporal filtering for background light. Quarter-wave plates and a half-wave
plate can unitarily transform the incoming polarization state to any state.
Figure 3.6: Free-space QKD experiment with the receiver equipped on a moving
truck (Reprinted from [48]). In addition to changing the basis choice to passive, the new
receiver incorporates spatial, spectral, and temporal filtering for background light. Half-
wave plates and a quarter-wave plate can unitarily transform the incoming polarization
state to any state. Blue circles on the top right corner indicate the distance the truck
traveled.
and pointing system for a moving truck, traveling at the speed equivalent to the angu-
lar speed of the satellite at 600 km heliosynchronous orbit [48]. The maximum angular
speed at the orbit is 0.72 ◦/s. This experiment tested the feasibility of uplink satellite
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QKD with a receiver on a moving truck, whose angular speed was 0.75 ◦/s. Signal pulse
generation, receiver design, and QKD protocol were the same from [47], except that polar-
ization compensating waveplates are moved to the transmitter, as shown in Fig. 3.6. With
80 MHz signal repetition rate, the secret key rate of 40 bps was achieved. This research
experimentally proved that QKD is feasible between a ground station and a moving object.
3.6 Ground-to-air/Ground-to-satellite experiments
A research group at LMU in Germany conducted a proof-of-principle airborne downlink
QKD experiment [50]. The experiment had an airplane carry the transmitter and travel in
a 20 km radius arc path at 290 km/h, which is equivalent to 4 mrad/s angular velocity, for
10 min. The transmitter sent four BB84 polarization states repeatedly because there was
only one classical communication link for post-processing. Signal pulses with the mean
photon number of 0.5 exited the transmitter telescope of 3 cm diameter aperture. The
receiver had 40 cm diameter telescope and a passive choice polarization analyzer.
In order to perform such key exchange, the transmitter and receiver had to establish
a link beforehand. As the plane entered the arc path, the transmitter and receiver share
their global positioning systems (GPS) coordinates and orient their telescopes accordingly.
The transmitter needs to be in the field-of-view (FOV) of the receiver before bidirectional
beacon lasers are activated for fine pointing. The total link loss including the single-photon
detection efficiency was 38 dB, and the mean sifted key rate of 145 bps with QBER of 4.8%
was produced. The major difference between this experiment and other ground-based
experiments was the need of the initial quantum channel establishment. This experiment
required more upgrades on technology for full QKD operation but it proved the feasibility
of exchanging quantum states with a flying object.
Researchers at UW in Canada much improved the technology and performed full uplink
airborne QKD experiment [52]. They exchanged quantum states for 14 passes in both line
and arc paths with channel link ranges of 3 km, 5 km, 7 km, and 10 km at the altitude of
≈1.6 km. The arc path length allowed longer key exchange time and more relaxed pointing,
acquisition, and tracking (PAT) system, but the line path was a better representative of
satellite paths.
Of 14 passes, 7 passes were successful at establishing a quantum link and 7 km line path
and 10 km arc path were the longest links for each configuration. For 10 km arc path, the
quantum link lasted for 269 s and 70947 secret bits with QBER of 3.39% were generated.
The mean total loss was 42.6 dB. For 7 km line path, Alice and Bob could only exchange
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quantum states for 158 s and 9566 secret bits with 3.58% QBER were produced. The mean
link loss was 51.1 dB. Previous experiments [45, 47] showed that the channel link loss is
between 40−50 dB for uplink QKD and this experiment demonstrated that it is feasible to
generate secret keys with such channel loss and an airplane, whose angular velocity was
similar to that of 600 km low-Earth-orbit satellite. The researchers noted that for the line
path, faster PAT system will be necessary for performance improvement.
Researchers at the University of Science and Technology of China, Ningbo University,
and Chinese Academy of Sciences in China experimentally verified three critical issues
for satellite-based QKD: 1. rapid angular velocity and acceleration, 2. unwanted random
motion of a satellite, 3. high link loss and atmospheric turbulence [51]. For angular velocity
and acceleration verifications, they paced the transmitter on a turntable 40 km away from
the receiver. The angular speed and acceleration of the turntable exceeded those of a low-
Earth-orbit satellite. Polarization-encoding BB84 with decoy states with the repetition
rate of 100 MHz was used. Total link loss for this test was ∼40 dB and the receiver could
detect quantum states at 4200 Hz. For a platform with unwanted random motion test,
they placed the transmitter on a floating hot-air balloon, 20 km away from the receiver.
This verified the PAT system’s ability to reestablish a quantum channel quickly whenever
the line-of-sight was achieved and their system could recapture the hot-air balloon and
exchange keys for 3−5 s. For high-loss free-space link, they placed the transmitter and
receiver 96 km away from each other, having total channel loss of ∼50 dB. Post-processing
was not performed but the receiver could detect 380 quantum states per second. For more
realistic experimental verification for satellite-based communication, developing excellent
PAT system is important.
Before China launched the first quantum satellite in 2016, researchers used retro-
reflectors on already launched satellites to simulate quantum communications [54, 55]. Yin
et al. [54] used a corner cube retro-reflector on CHAMP satellite (400 km low-Earth-orbit)
to verify downlink single-photon transmission and detection feasibility. This experiment
could test all three critical issues mentioned in the previous paragraph at once but QKD
was not performed. Theoretical total link loss from the reflector to the receiving telescope
was ≈41 dB, so the expected photon number per pulse at the receiver was 6.83×10−5. The
reflected mean photon number per pulse obtained from an experiment was 6.75 × 10−5,
which complies with the theoretical value. Therefore, this research proved the feasibility
of sharing quantum states with a satellite.
Now that single-photon pulses reflected from retro-reflectors on a satellite can be de-
tected at a ground station, Vallone et al. from Italy [55] sent BB84 polarization states
(horizontal, vertical, clockwise circular, anticlockwise circular polarizations) to be reflected
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off of Jason-2, Larets, Starlette, and Stella satellites. These satellites have corner cube
retro-reflectors with polarization preservation coatings. For comparison, they also sent
pulses to Ajisai satellite whose retro-reflector does not preserve polarizations. For the
satellites with polarization preserving retro-reflectors, the average polarization measure-
ment error was 4.6±0.8%, while the error from Ajisai is 40.5±0.7%. These results showed
that single-photon polarization states can be obtained under different conditions and that
polarization-encoding BB84 QKD is feasible.
In August, 2016, China launched 600 kg quantum satellite called Micius and performed
the first QKD and entanglement distribution using downlink configuration, and quantum
teleportation experiment using uplink configuration [61–63]. The satellite orbits at an
altitude of 500 km and carries both entangled-photon pair source and weak coherent pulse
source for all three experiments.
For QKD experiment, polarization-encoding BB84 with decoy states protocol was uti-
lized [61]. 850 nm wavelength was chosen for transmission and eight laser diodes were
implemented for producing four signal and four decoy polarization states. The satellite
passes over Xinglong ground station once every night at 12:50 AM for 5 min [61]. 10 min
before the satellite came into the view of the ground station, its attitude was adjusted to
face the ground station. The satellite pass was a straight line path when observed by a
ground station,so as shown in Fig. 3.7(a), the link distance between the satellite and the
ground station varied from 645 km to 1200 km during the pass.
After 273 s of quantum key exchange, the sifted key rate obtained was 12 kbps at 645 km
and 1 kbps at 1200 km. After error correction and privacy amplification, the secret key rate
of 1.1 kbps was achieved with average QBER of 1.1% and total link loss of 40 dB at 1200 km.
This is an incredible achievement proving that satellite-based QKD is indeed possible.
The technological challenge for satellite-based entanglement distribution was that the
satellite needs to control two different transmitting telescopes to send entangled photons
to two different optical ground stations [62]. Thus, two independent PAT systems were
implemented. The entangled photons generated on the satellite were |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 |V 〉+
|V 〉 |H〉) and these were distributed between ground station in Delingha and Nanshan in
Urumqi (1120 km) and between ground station in Delingha and Gaomeigu Observatory in
Lijiang.
As two ground stations were separated by at least 1100 km, the satellite passed over
each station at different times as shown in Fig. 3.8. Thus, the two-link channel length
varied between 1600 km and 2400 km and the overall link loss fluctuated between 64 dB and
68.5 dB. (The ground-based experiment [46] experienced total channel link loss between
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Figure 3.7: Downlink satellite-based QKD using polarization-encoding BB84
with decoy states on December 19, 2016 between Micius and Xinglong optical
ground station (Reprinted from [61]).
66 dB and 85 dB for entanglement distribution.) Once again, the ground-based feasibility
test verified the entanglement distribution for the correct channel link loss range. Fidelity
of the received entangled pairs was F ≥ 0.87± 0.09 and the correlation value from CHSH
inequality was 2.37± 0.09. Both values confirmed that the photon pairs are entangled.
For quantum teleporation experiment, the satellite functioned as a receiver and a trans-
mitter at Ngari, Tibet generated a single qubit and teleported it to the satellite using
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 |H〉 + |V 〉 |V 〉) [63]. The ground station generated six polarization states
in rectilinear, diagonal, and circular bases. The total link loss varied between 41 dB and
52 dB, as the link distance changed between 500 km and 1400 km. For each pass, photons
from entangled pairs could be sent for 350 s, yielding an average fidelity of 0.8 ± 0.01.
Satellite-based QKD, entanglement distribution (Bell test), and quantum teleportation
were all successfully operated and silicon SPADs were utilized as single-photon detectors
in all tests.
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Figure 3.8: Channel attenuation between the quantum satellite and two optical
ground stations (Reprinted from [62]).
3.7 Conclusion
It took 25 years from the first free-space QKD experiment [79] to the satellite-based quan-
tum communications [61–63]. The launch of the Chinese satellite Micius is the first step
towards establishing a global-scale quantum communication network. Now, there are efforts
to perform quantum communications at daylight [44, 49], which require better background
light filtering and PAT systems. There are also research on sending quantum satellites
to medium-Earth-orbit (2000−36 000 km) [57] and geostationary orbit (>36 000 km) [60]
to increase the communication duration and relax the complexity of the PAT system. In
addition, studies on how the Doppler effect affect polarization states are conducted [53, 59]
and time-bin encoding is proposed as another method for satellite-based QKD [58, 90].
There are also efforts to study the behaviour of quantum technologies under space con-
ditions and launch a smaller payload using a Cube-Sat (10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm satellite)
[56, 64, 91, 92]. As the research on satellite-based quantum communications progresses, we
may have a quantum satellite constellation network in the next 25 years. An immediate
challenge to overcome to achieve such a network is radiation in space because it increases
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the dark count rate of silicon SPADs [56, 65, 66, 68, 69]. As shown in Table 3.2, the dark
count rate plays a critical role in the secret key rate generated by QKD and in determining
the maximum operational distances for Bell’s inequality test and for quantum teleporta-
tion. Without any radiation damage mitigation in SPADs in space, the useful lifetime
of a quantum satellite is shortened. Therefore, before launching a quantum satellite, we
must study how to reverse the radiation damage in space. Before explaining my radiation
damage mitigation method, the next chapter describes how silicon SPADs operate and the
following chapter discusses radiation in space and how it damages silicon SPADs.
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Chapter 4
Silicon Single-Photon Avalanche Photodiode
and Quenching Circuit
4.1 Introduction
Single-photon detectors are essential components in quantum communications and silicon
Single-Photon Avalanche photoDiode (SPAD) have the best performance yet and are com-
mercially available. This chapter describes how silicon SPADs operate as a single-photon
detector and explains important parameters.
4.2 Operating principle
Silicon SPADs are diodes with the following structure:
Figure 4.1: P-type reach-through avalanche photodiode (Reprinted from [93]).
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Figure 4.2: Diode I-V curve (Reprinted from [94]).
Figure 4.3: Band diagram representation of impact ionization process (Reprinted
from [96]).
The structure is similar to the regular diodes and have the same I-V characteristics as
them, as shown in Fig. 4.2. However, SPADs are only reverse-biased above the breakdown
voltage (Vbr) for photon detection operation. An incident photon is absorbed in the silicon
bulk, called pi-region in Fig. 4.1, and creates an electron-hole pair. Under the reverse bias,
the electron-hole pair can be swept across pi-region and reach the avalanche region, P+
layer, which is thin and thus has a very high electric field. When a carrier travels across
the region, it may collide with a silicon atom and transfer the excitation energy, creating
another electron-hole pair. This process is called impact ionization, as shown in Fig. 4.3.
Now, each electron-hole pair can independently generate a new pair until they exit the
junction. Under a high electric field, impact ionization can occur frequently, producing a
macroscopic electric current (mA range) [95]. This process of generating a high current
from an electron-hole pair is called avalanche effect.
SPADs can be in different operation modes. If the reverse bias is below the breakdown
voltage, the diode is in linear mode. The generated electric current is proportional to
input light intensity with a certain gain R. If it is above the breakdown voltage, it is in
single-photon detection mode, which is also known as Geiger mode [97]. In Geiger mode, a
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macroscopic current can be generated from a single photon, but this current needs to be
quenched by an external circuit [95].
4.3 Quenching circuits
Figure 4.4 shows the typical passive quenching circuit. Vbias is set to Vbr+Vexcess. At rest,
no current flows in the circuit [95]. A photon absorption closes the switch and causes the
discharge of both capacitors Cd and Cs, producing i(t) = (Vd(t) − Vbr)/Rd to flow. The
macroscopic current increases the voltage across a high resistance, R1, and it automatically
lowers Vd(t) close to Vbr. When i(t) becomes smaller than ∼100 µA, the avalanche current
stops to flow [95]. During this avalanche process, the SPAD is insensitive to any incoming
photons and the time constant for the quenching process is τquenching ≈ (Cd + Cs)Rd.
Figure 4.5 shows an avalanche pulse of a silicon SPAD at Vout.
APD
R1
R2
Vbias
R1
R2
Vbias
Vbr
Rd
Cd CsVd
Vout
Figure 4.4: Passive quenching circuit with SPAD modeling (Redrawn from [95]).
R1 is a high-impedance quenching resistor and R2 is a small impedance readout resistor.
Cd (Cs) is the junction (parasitic stray) capacitance.
After the current flow is completely stopped, the SPAD switch is opened again and the
capacitors are recharged. The SPAD becomes sensitive to single photons again during the
recharge process, so Fig. 4.6 shows that it is feasible to trigger a current flow before fully
reaching Vbias. Recharge time constant is τrecharge = (Cd + Cs)R1. These time constants
for the quenching process and the recharge time determine the speed of SPADs.
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Figure 4.5: Oscilloscope capture of an avalanche pulse. The avalanche pulse is a
voltage waveform measured at Vout in Fig. 4.5.
Figure 4.6: Oscilloscope capture of the recharge process. The avalanche pulses are
measured at Vout in Fig. 4.5. The oscilloscope’s trigger point is set to the leftmost reference
avalanche pulse. It is visible that the subsequent avalanche pulses’ amplitudes form an
envelope of an exponential function. Its time constant should be τrecharge = (Cd + Cs)R1.
An avalanche pulse can be triggered anytime during the recovery of Vd, but since the
macroscopic current, i(t), is proportional to Vd, the output pulse amplitude is small when
Vd − Vbr is small.
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Figure 4.7: Detector saturation curve as a function of calibrated optical power
(Reprinted from [98].) When the count rate exceeds the saturation level, the mean
avalanche pulse amplitude becomes smaller, causing the counter discriminator with a fixed
threshold voltage to miss avalanche pulses. As the input optical power increases, the count
rate eventually drops to zero. Figure title is also copied from [98].
When the count rate exceeds the saturation level, an avalanche pulse is more frequently
triggered before reaching Vbias. Thus, the mean amplitude of the avalanche pulses also
becomes smaller and the pulse amplitude distribution widens. The passive quenching
circuit uses a fixed discriminator threshold value to distinguish avalanche pulses from
noise, so if the avalanche pulse amplitude is below the threshold, it is missed, resulting in a
decreased count rate. Figure 4.7 shows how the count rate changes with increasing optical
input power. The same over-saturation effect can occur for SPADs with a very high dark
count rate (false photon count rate). Thus, it is important to measure the pulse amplitude
distribution to verify the over-saturation effect.
Active quenching circuit uses a feedback loop to quench the avalanche pulse much
quickly by lowering Vbias to Vbr [95]. After a fixed hold-off time, Vbias is also quickly
recovered. Therefore, active quenching circuit provides a faster detection rate than passive
quenching circuit, but it requires more complex circuit.
Gated-mode operation is used if the receiver knows when to expect the incoming pho-
tons [95]. It sets the SPAD below Vbr. Just before a photon is expected, an external circuit
sends a narrow voltage pulse to place the SPAD in Geiger mode. The SPAD is quickly
quenched when the voltage pulse comes back to zero. This mode has advantages of fast
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quenching to limit the population of trapped electrons and of restricting dark count occur-
ring only when the voltage pulses are applied. However, this mode requires synchronization
between two communicating parties and extra signal filtering are necessary for removing
the gate pulses from the detection output signals.
4.4 Parameters
4.4.1 Dark count rate
A dark count is a false photon count caused by thermally excited, tunneling, and trapped
electrons [97]. Electrons are excited by thermal energy and defect levels in the bandgap in-
creases the probability. Lowering temperature can exponentially decrease thermally excited
electrons. Electron tunneling occurs at a very high bias voltage because the pn junction in
the avalanche region in Fig. 4.3 is stretched out vertically, making the bandgap energy in
the junction to be very thin. With the help of defect levels, electrons in the valence band
can move to the conduction band. To reduce this effect, SPADs should not be biased too
high. During an avalanche process, electrons can be trapped in deep defect levels produced
by impurities. Given a fixed number of trap levels, the population of trapped electrons
is proportional to the total charge passing through the SPAD. The trapped electrons can
be released during or after Vbias is fully recharged and trigger a false avalanche effect,
which is also known as an afterpulse. Usually, trapped electrons are released during the
quenching process at room temperature. However, at lower temperature, trapped electrons
have longer lifetimes, so afterpulses are more likely to occur during or after Vbias is fully
recharged and trigger a false photon count. Thermal generation and afterpulses constitute
the majority of the dark count rate.
4.4.2 Photon detection efficiency
The photon detection efficiency is comprised of three main factors [95]. The first fac-
tor is the internal quantum efficiency. It indicates the probability of an absorbed photon
creating an electron-hole pair. Next is the photoelectron efficiency. This is the probabil-
ity of the electron-hole pair reaching the avalanche region before recombination. Lastly,
the avalanche efficiency measures the probability of the electron-hole pair triggering an
avalanche effect to generate a macroscopic current, detectable as a photon count. Photon
detection efficiency increases with Vbias because a stronger electric field can increase both
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photoelectron efficiency and avalanche efficiency. In the linear (classical) regime, the pho-
todiode is no longer sensitive to single photons due to the noise current, so the detection
efficiency is defined by the external quantum efficiency (ηe):
ηe =
hνIph
qPin
(4.1)
where h is the Planck constant, ν input signal frequency, Iph output photocurrent, q the
electric charge, and Pin the input optical power.
4.4.3 Timing jitter
The timing jitter is the temporal variation of detection output signal with respect to a
photon absorption at a reference time. This parameter becomes important when two
communicating parties want to share accurate detection timestamps for classical post-
processing. Timing jitter can be reduced by increasing Vbias because carriers under a high
electric field travels much faster to reach the avalanche region.
4.4.4 Afterpulsing probability
Afterpulsing probability analysis calculates how often afterpulses occur in the dark count
rate and what the lifetimes of trapped electrons are. For every detection event, our software
adds all subsequent detection events occurring up to 10−2 s later to a histogram, with expo-
nentially growing time bins [99], as shown in Fig. 4.8. Unlike the standard autocorrelation
method, this improved analysis produces a plot that converges to the background count
rate, instead of following an exponential decay. Using exponentially increasing bin sizes
filters out statistical fluctuations in the tail and also resolves the fast changing avalanche
peak.
The shape of this histogram (Fig. 4.8) presents four features: an SPAD’s dead time,
its recharge time, its trapped-electron time constants, and the background count rate. In
Fig. 4.8, the dead time begins immediately after a photon detection (time 0) and ends
when counts begin to reappear at roughly 0.8 µs. This is when the SPAD is insensitive to
any input single-photons. The recharge time is the time it takes for the count rate to reach
the peak value after the dead time. Trapping time constants can be found by fitting the
exponentially decaying slope of the peak. The plot levels off to the background count rate
and the black shaded area is the afterpulsing probability.
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Figure 4.8: Afterpulsing histogram example. The histogram of the time difference
between SPAD output pulses shows the SPAD’s dead time from 0 to roughly 0.8 µs, followed
by a recharge time of ≈150 ns. The following peak is formed of afterpulses. The count
rates then settle down to the background count rate of ≈200 Hz. A possible reason for
a slight increase in the count rate at the end is the high voltage supply rebounding after
being slightly sagged by the charge being drawn by the single avalanche. The black shaded
area is the afterpulsing probability.
4.5 Conclusion
A silicon SPAD can be biased above Vbr to operate in Geiger mode, which enables single-
photon detection. A detector is fully characterized from measured dark count rate, photon
detection efficiency, timing jitter, and afterpulsing probability. For space applications, the
bulk silicon in the SPAD is vulnerable to radiation damages. The next chapter explains
why and shows radiation dose estimations and radiation tests on silicon SPADs to predict
their behaviours in real space.
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Chapter 5
Impact of Radiation Damage in Space
5.1 Introduction
Energetic electrons and protons trapped in Earth’s magnetic fields and solar protons that
penetrate the magnetic fields cause radiation damages to any equipment in the orbit.
Electronics equipped on satellites should be manufactured to withstand such damages but
silicon Single-Photon Avalanche photoDiode (SPAD) are particularly vulnerable to radia-
tion damages. A few studies [65, 66, 68, 100] found that these radiation damages increase
the dark count rate of silicon SPADs. However, for ground-to-satellite quantum commu-
nications, it is advised to keep the dark count rate below 200 Hz per detector to achieve
good performance (See Section 3.3). As a result, it is important to estimate radiation doses
accumulated over the operation period at a desired orbit and to experimentally check the
rate of dark count rate increase for the mission time. This chapter explains how the en-
ergetic particles increase the dark count rate, how radiation dose was estimated for the
two projects of this thesis, and how commercial silicon SPADs reacted to monochromatic
proton radiation.
5.2 How does radiation in space affect a low-Earth-orbit quantum
satellite?
In spite of the protection by Earth’s magnetic fields, radiation exposure in low-Earth-orbit
is due to a slight offset in Earth’s rotational axis and magnetic pole. The offset causes
the inner radiation belt to be pulled towards Earth’s surface down to 200 km above the
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Figure 5.1: Earth’s radiation belts (Reprinted from [101]). A slight offset in Earth’s
rotational axis and magnetic pole causes the inner radiation belt to be pulled towards
Earth’s surface down to 200 km above the sea level near South America.
Figure 5.2: Proton and electron fluxes at 800 km above the sea level (Reprinted
from [69]).
sea level near South America, as shown in Fig. 5.1. This region is called South Atlantic
Anomaly (SAA). Figure 5.2 shows that radiation exposure is much higher in the southern
hemisphere. Thus, devices equipped on satellites pass through the affected regions, so they
need to be radiation-proof to remain operational for the entire mission time.
Trapped electrons cause ionization damage, while trapped protons cause displacement
damage [65]. Ionization damage creates trapped charges in the insulation layers, so it is
detrimental to devices such as complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor but its effect is
negligible in silicon SPADs when compared to the damage done by trapped protons. The
protons displace silicon atoms and create additional defects, forming extra energy levels in
the bandgap. This allows more electrons to be excited with less thermal energy and thus
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Figure 5.3: Effect of aluminum shielding for radiation damage mitigation
(Reprinted from [102]). Total dose for a 5-year mission at 705 km polar orbit.
produce a higher dark count rate.
Shielding electronic devices with aluminum can reduce total radiation doses [102]. Ion-
ization damage can be greatly reduced if more than 5 mm thick aluminum is used, as
shown in Fig. 5.3. However, the reduction of displacement damage is not as significant
and satellite mass restriction also limits the amount of shielding. Thus, understanding the
impact of proton radiation damage on silicon SPADs is essential to predict how long they
can operate in space and to identify radiation damage mitigation methods.
5.3 Radiation dose calculation
The SPENVIS software [103] is used for radiation dose calculation with custom orbit in-
formation and operation duration. For trapped protons, AP8-MIN and AP8-MAX models
are used and they are based on real radiation data in space collected between 1960s and
1970s [104]. They are now accurate within a factor of two. For our calculation, AP8-MIN
is used because the solar cycle 24 will be at the solar minimum in 2018-2020 and it gives
worse radiation damage to the silicon SPADs [105]. For trapped electrons, AE8-MAX is
used as it gives higher ionization damage. For long-term solar proton damage, the model
developed by JPL is used for mission time longer than a year. Various aluminum shield-
ing thickness can also be taken into account and the software outputs total Displacement
Damage Dose (DDD).
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Figure 5.4: Proton energy spectrum and corresponding non-ionization energy
loss for silicon (Reprinted from [69]).
Figure 5.4 shows that protons in space possess a spectrum of energy and each energy has
a different non-ionization energy loss (NIEL), which is the damage impact factor. It also
shows that protons with lower energies have higher NIEL, so more displacement damage
occurs when the orbit changes from the equatorial to polar and when a satellite is farther
away from the Earth due to the increased fluence of low energy protons. Total DDD can
be calculated by integrating the product of proton fluences curve (Fig. 5.4(a)) and NIEL
curve (Fig. 5.4(b)) over the entire energy spectrum.
DDD (MeV/g) =
∫ ∞
0
φp(E) ∗NIEL(E) dE (5.1)
where φp(E) is the proton fluences (cm
−2) and NIEL(E) is NIEL (MeV ∗ cm−2/g) at
energy E.
For radiation testing at a facility, generated protons are monochromatic and their flu-
ences are controlled. Thus, total DDD needs to be converted to proton fluences for a
monochromatic energy. The SPEVNIS software allows a user to input a monochromatic
energy and then uses the following equation [100] to also output equivalent proton fluences
at the selected proton energy:
φp(Eselected) =
DDD(MeV/g)
NIEL(Eselected)
(5.2)
42
Table 5.1: Simulated fluences at 100 MeV protons and equivalent mission dura-
tions at QEYSSat orbit. QEYSSat orbit is a heliosynchronous 600 km noon-midnight
orbit.
Target fluence
(p/cm2)
Equivalent mission
duration at
QEYSSat orbit
(months)
1× 108 0.6
1× 109 6
2× 109 12
4× 109 24
5.3.1 Radiation dose calculation for QEYSSat orbit for first laser annealing
experiments
The samples (Excelitas SLiK, Excelitas C30902SH, Laser Components SAP500S2) that are
tested in the first laser annealing experiments were initially irradiated for a recent study
by Anisimova et al. [70]. The target orbit is a heliosynchronous 600 km noon-midnight
orbit (Quantum Encryption and Science Satellite (QEYSSat) orbit) and 10 mm aluminum
shielding is added for the calculation. Expected mission duration is 24 months, so flu-
ences of 100 MeV protons are calculated for 0.6, 6, 12, and 24 months. Table 5.1 lists
corresponding proton fluences. Two Excelitas SLiK and two Laser Components SAP500S2
are irradiated at each proton fluence level, while Excelitas C30902SHs are irradiated at
1× 109/cm2 only.
5.3.2 Radiation dose calculation for International Space Station orbit for sec-
ond laser annealing experiments
Laser Components’ new silicon SPAD model, SAP300, provided by Prof. Alex Ling’s group
at the National University of Singapore (NUS), is irradiated for further studies on the laser
annealing effect. NUS is interested in the radiation environment in the International Space
Station (ISS) orbit for its nanosatellite but they could also be used for the QEYSSat
project, so proton fluences are carefully selected to cover both parties’ mission durations
at their targeted orbits. Table 5.2 shows simulated proton fluences and their equivalent
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mission durations in the ISS and QEYSSat orbits.
Table 5.2: Target fluences at 100 MeV proton energy and equivalent mission
durations at ISS and QEYSSat orbits. ISS orbit is 400 km low Earth orbit with the
inclination angle of 51.64°, while QEYSSat orbit is a heliosynchronous 600 km dusk-dawn
orbit. 1.8 mm aluminum shielding is chosen for the ISS orbit, while 10 mm aluminum
shielding is selected for the QEYSSat orbit. Our results from SPENVIS shows that the
QEYSSat orbit experiences about three times as much proton radiation as the ISS orbit.
Module
Identifier
Target fluence
(p/cm2)
Equivalent mission
duration at ISS
orbit (months)
Equivalent mission
duration at
QEYSSat orbit
(months)
LC-A 1.66× 108 3 1
LC-B 1.66× 108 3 1
LC-C 3.32× 108 6 2
LC-D 3.32× 108 6 2
LC-E 6.73× 108 12 4
LC-F 6.73× 108 12 4
LC-G 6.73× 108 12 4
LC-H 6.73× 108 12 4
LC-I 2× 109 36 12
LC-J 2× 109 36 12
LC-K 4× 109 72 24
LC-L 4× 109 72 24
5.4 Radiation testing
All proton radiation tests were performed at TRIUMF, Vancouver, Canada [106].
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5.4.1 Samples for the first laser annealing experiments
The radiation test results are explained in detail by Anisimova et al. [70] but the notable
results are that all detectors are saturated after proton fluences equivalent to one year
mission time at the QEYSSat orbit when characterized at 0 ◦C. Highlighted section in
Fig. 5.5 shows how the dark count rate changes during proton irradiation. For proper
quantum communications operations, radiation damage mitigation methods are required
to reduce the dark count rate.
Figure 5.5: Dark count rate of silicon SPADs during proton irradiation
(Reprinted from [70]). SPADs are biased at 20 V above the breakdown voltage and their
base temperatures are kept at 0 ◦C. The dark count rate of C309021SH and SAP500S2
appear to decrease after some time, but this actually means that the dark count rate ex-
ceeded the saturation level, so avalanche pulses are too small for the discriminator circuit
to distinguish them (See Section 4.3).
5.4.2 Samples for the second laser annealing experiments
Table 5.3 shows initial characterizations performed by NUS using its passive quenching
circuit and by Institute for Quantum Computing (IQC) using a custom detector module,
shown in Fig. 5.6, at TRIUMF. Breakdown voltage, dark count rate, and average avalanche
pulse height are measured at room temperature. The discrepancies in the data are due to
different electronics used for characterization and temperature variations. At TRIUMF,
SPADs are connected to the detector module via receptacles to avoid a soldering iron
thermally annealing SPADs after proton radiation. A metal plate holds SPAD packages
in place (see Figure 5.7) and we placed black metal tape on SPAD glass windows to block
light. In addition, the detector module is then placed on a metal bracket inside a desk
drawer at TRIUMF (see Figure 5.8) to provide as dark environment as possible for proper
characterization.
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Table 5.3: Initial characterization performed by NUS and IQC. NUS characterized
the samples at 22 ◦C. It was not possible to control the operating temperature at TRIUMF,
so a Platinum temperature sensor (Pt 100) connected to an industrial controller (JUMO
dTRON) in 4-wire configuration monitors the temperature of the metal plate. The tem-
perature during characterization is noted down as operating temperature. The discrepancy
in the mean pulse amplitude is due to different readout resistor values used by NUS and
IQC. Vbr: Breakdown voltage, Vbias: Bias voltage, Vex: Excess voltage (Vbias−Vbr), DCR:
Dark count rate, MPA: Mean pulse amplitude, OT: Operating temperature.
Module
Identifier
NUS IQC
Vbr
(V)
Vbias
(V)
Vex
(V)
DCR
(Hz)
MPA
(mV)
OT
(◦C)
Vbr
(V)
Vbias
(V)
Vex
(V)
DCR
(Hz)
MPA
(mV)
LC-A 162.9 173.4 10.5 12000 510 21 161.2 171.7 10.5 10518 135.4
LC-B 163.9 174.4 10.5 14300 530 21.3 161.1 171.6 10.5 12090 122.6
LC-C 157 167.5 10.6 14600 604 24.7 155.6 166.2 10.6 15243 125
LC-D 166.6 177.3 10.7 16800 538 24.7 167 177.7 10.7 19652 130
LC-E 165.5 176.5 11.1 13800 531 22.9 165.1 176.2 11.1 14612 136.5
LC-F 167 177.7 10.6 15700 511 23.1 165.5 176.1 10.6 15958 116.2
LC-G 160.2 171.3 11.1 15800 587 22.2 159.6 170.7 11.1 15617 157.7
LC-H 163.8 175 11.2 17800 642 22.2 161.8 173 11.2 16262 151.5
LC-I 157.5 168 10.6 16500 590 22.4 155 165.6 10.6 13632 131
LC-J 159.5 170.2 10.6 16500 553 22.4 157.8 168.4 10.6 15027 126
LC-K 160.7 171.8 11.1 16800 600 22.7 158.2 169.3 11.1 15107 131.5
LC-L 156.5 167.5 11.1 16500 553 22.5 155.3 166.4 11.1 16385 124.8
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100 Ω
560 kΩ
APD
Time-tagging unit
 or oscilloscope
R1
R2
C1
10 nF
+HV
50 Ω
R3
Detector module
+Vbias
50 Ω coaxial cable
Figure 5.6: A schematic of a detector module. The detector module can house six
SPADs but only one channel is shown here. Each channel contains a passive quenching
circuit, is connected to an external high-voltage supply, and outputs to a time-tagging unit
or an oscilloscope. (See Section 4.3 for the description of how the detector module works.)
Figure 5.7: Photo of the Laser component SPAD mounted on a detector module.
After proton irradiation, all samples are characterized at TRIUMF. Table 5.4 shows that
high-energy protons increase the dark count rates of most samples while those of LC-A, LC-
E, LC-I, and LC-K are decreased when they are characterized at TRIUMF. The reduction is
due to saturation in electronics, as explained in Section 4.3. After returning from the trip to
TRIUMF, each sample’s characterization as well as avalanche pulse amplitude distribution
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Figure 5.8: Photo of the Laser component SPAD mounted on a detector module
placed on a metal bracket.
are performed and analyzed at room temperature to confirm this saturation effect and the
samples are also characterized further at −20 ◦C, where SPADs are not saturated, to find
the relationship between the dark count rate and proton radiation fluences. In Figure 5.9,
the distribution at room temperature shifts toward 0 mV and it becomes wider, as SPADs
are exposed to higher proton fluences. At −20 ◦C, all SPADs are not saturated, so the
distribution curves are narrow and slopes are sharper.
Table 5.5 shows the characterization results at −20 ◦C. All samples are no longer sat-
urated (See Section 4.3 for the explanation of the saturation effect); thus, the relationship
between the dark count rate and the proton radiation fluences can be better analyzed from
the data. For each proton radiation fluence, samples’ dark count rates are averaged and
these values are plotted in Figure 5.10.
In addition to these SAP300s irradiated and characterized at TRIUMF, NUS sent three
SAP300s that were previously irradiated. Table 5.6 summarizes the characterization results
taken by them and these samples are used for testing whether the laser annealing effect is
permanent.
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Table 5.4: Characterization performed by IQC at TRIUMF. Samples with high-
lighted cells seem to have their dark count rates reduced after proton irradiation, probably
due to saturation. Mean pulse amplitude is measured with 100 mV trigger level at TRI-
UMF and with 20 mV at IQC to analyze the saturation effect. With 20 mV threshold,
a more accurate mean pulse amplitude can be measured as SPADs with higher radiation
dose saturates and triggers avalanche pulses more often during the recharge process, as
explained in Section 4.3. Vbr: Breakdown voltage, Vbias: Bias voltage, Vex: Excess volt-
age (Vbias − Vbr), DCR: Dark count rate, MPA: Mean pulse amplitude, OT: Operating
temperature..
Module
Identifier
May 3rd, 2017 (TRIUMF) May 31st, 2017 (IQC)
OT
(◦C)
Vbr
(V)
Vbias
(V)
Vex
(V)
DCR
(Hz)
MPA
(mV)
OT
(◦C)
Vbr
(V)
Vbias
(V)
Vex
(V)
DCR
(Hz)
MPA
(mV)
LC-A 26.4 163.5 174 10.5 1593 117.4 22.3 161.2 171.7 10.5 79808 115.5
LC-B 26.4 164.4 174.9 10.5 84473 116.3 22.3 162.2 172.7 10.5 42699 109
LC-C 26.8 157 167.6 10.6 47011 124 23.5 154.7 165.3 10.6 84170 117
LC-D 26.8 167.5 178.2 10.7 113637 117 23.5 165.4 176.1 10.7 63848 112
LC-E 27 166.9 178 11.1 650 116.6 23.7 164.7 175.8 11.1 119525 99
LC-F 27 167.7 178.3 10.6 84288 114.6 23.4 165.9 176.5 10.6 62261 85
LC-G 27 160.8 171.9 11.1 27284 121.5 23.2 158.7 169.8 11.1 109819 111
LC-H 26.9 163 174.2 11.2 124526 116.8 23 160.7 171.9 11.2 103143 102.5
LC-I 27 157.7 168.3 10.6 3502 104 22.8 155.3 165.9 10.6 130997 97
LC-J 27 160.8 171.4 10.6 75534 116 22.8 158.1 168.7 10.6 72117 85.5
LC-K 27 161 172.1 11.1 5.87 109 23.3 158.8 169.9 11.1 96935 65
LC-L 27 157.1 168.2 11.1 27699 116.8 23.2 154.7 165.8 11.1 46580 65
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Table 5.5: Characterization performed at −20 ◦C at IQC. Platinum temperature
sensor (Pt 100) connected to an industrial controller (JUMO dTRON) in 4-wire configura-
tion monitors the temperature of the metal plate. The temperature during characterization
is noted down as operating temperature. The trigger level is 20 mV for mean pulse am-
plitude measurement. Vbr: Breakdown voltage, Vbias: Bias voltage, Vex: Excess voltage
(Vbias − Vbr), DCR: Dark count rate, MPA: Mean pulse amplitude, OT: Operating tem-
perature.
Module
Identifier
IQC
Operating
temperature
(◦C)
Vbr
(V)
Vbias
(V)
Vex
(V)
Dark count
rate (Hz)
Mean pulse
amplitude
(mV)
LC-A −19.7 136.3 146.8 10.5 2677 123
LC-B −19.7 137 147.5 10.5 1174 117
LC-C −19.7 130.9 141.5 10.6 2159 134
LC-D −19.7 140.2 150.9 10.7 1993 135
LC-E −19.7 138.2 149.3 11.1 3854 125.5
LC-F −19.7 139.2 149.8 10.6 5073 109
LC-G −19.7 134.9 146 11.1 4303 125
LC-H −19.7 135.3 146.5 11.2 5339 127
LC-I −19.7 131 141.6 10.6 6149 127
LC-J −19.7 133.3 143.9 10.6 8097 120.5
LC-K −20.5 133 144.1 11.1 20249 132
LC-L −20.5 131.1 142.2 11.1 17830 115
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Dark count rate and proton radiation fluences correlation
Figure 5.10: Relationship between dark count rates and proton radiation flu-
ences. The solid line is a linear function that passes through the first and last data points.
The dark count rate is characterized at −20 ◦C.
Table 5.6: Characterization of irradiated SAP300s performed by NUS. These
SAP300s were irradiated behind extra metal shielding. LC-M had 24 mm thick Aluminum
was placed at the front of it, while LC-N and LC-O had 30 mm thick Titanium shielding
in front of them.
Module
Identifier
DDD before
extra shielding
(MeV/g)
Vbr (V) Vbias (V)
Dark count
rate (Hz)
Before After Before After Before After
LC-M 2.5× 105 147.68 147.68 155.94 156.09 17373 18541
LC-N 5× 105 148.97 148.71 157.18 158.04 16147 27241
LC-O 2.5× 105 150.52 150.26 160.37 160.49 24647 27082
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5.5 Conclusion
I estimated radiation dose for low-Earth-orbit missions for QEYSSat and ISS orbits.
Through experiments, it is found that the dark count rate increase and proton fluences
have a linear relationship and that proton radiation will eventually saturate silicon SPADs.
Thus, radiation damage mitigation methods need to be developed. It is shown that cooling
the detectors can exponentially decrease the dark count rate [70, 95, 98], but it does not
undo radiation damages. The next chapter studies the feasibility of using silicon SPADs
with built-in thermoelectric coolers for a 1-year mission inside one of the ISS vessels. The
radiation test results by Anisimova et al. [70] and the SPENVIS software are utilized to
analyze how much cooling is required and check if such cooling is practically feasible.
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Chapter 6
Estimation of Radiation Damage inside the
International Space Station for the
Space-QUEST experiment
This chapter is based on a publication [107]. See Statement of Contributions.
6.1 Introduction
Space-QUEST [107] is a proposed fundamental physics experiment to test whether en-
tangled photon pairs decohere when each photon travels at a different gravitational field
gradient. The plan is to generate entangled photons on Earth and send one photon to a
receiver located inside one of the International Space Station (ISS) vessels, where single-
photon detectors are placed, and measure the other photon on Earth. Silicon Single-Photon
Avalanche photoDiode (SPAD)s are potential candidates for single-photon detectors due
to their performances and no need for cryogenic cooling. For the experiment, it is desirable
to have Dark Count Rate (DCR) below 2000 Hz for useful data. However, in the previous
chapter, it is shown that the space radiation environment damages silicon SPADs, so the
radiation environment inside the ISS is estimated to study the feasibility of using them for
the experiment. Although the mission duration is expected to be less than a year, a 2-year
exposure is calculated to have a contingency margin.
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Figure 6.1: Overall experiment scheme for Space-QUEST proposal [107]. The
ground station prepares both entangled photon pairs and non-entangled faint pulse sources.
A photon from the entangled pair is immediately measured at the ground station (in
the same gravitational potential), and the other photon is transmitted to the ISS. Non-
entangled faint pulse sources are also measured both at the ground station and at the ISS.
The decoherence factor of the non-entangled faint pulse sources is zero, so if the entangled
pairs exhibit gravitational potential decoherence, their results must be different from those
of the non-entangled faint pulse sources.
6.2 Radiation dose calculation
The detector module with 20 mm thick spherical aluminum shielding is assumed. Storing it
in a random place inside the ISS typically adds 10 mm additional shielding by the pressure
vessel and micro-meteoroid orbital debris impact shield of the ISS [108, 109]. A total of
30 mm spherical aluminum shielding is considered. Using the SPENVIS software, total
Displacement Damage Dose (DDD) after 2 years under these assumptions is calculated to
be 1.27× 106 MeV g−1. While the calculated DDD monotonically decreases with increased
shield thickness, it does not depend on it strongly for thicknesses that can reasonably be
used in this mission. For example, doubling the total thickness to 60 mm would less than
halve the DDD, while adding significant extra weight to the detector module.
The dark count rate estimates are based on proton irradiation tests reported by Anisi-
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Figure 6.2: Dark count rates of three different SPAD models at various radiation
fluences at −86 ◦C [70]. Each data point is an average between the two samples tested.
Linear fit lines pass through the first and last data points. The dark count rate increase
appears to be linearly proportional to the proton fluence. Inset is a close-up of the first
points.
mova et al. [70]. Test samples were irradiated by different proton fluences, as mentioned
in Section 5.3.1. Two samples of each model were irradiated at each fluence, then their
dark count rates were measured at 20 V above the breakdown voltages at several temper-
atures down to −86 ◦C (see Fig. 6.2). The increase of the dark count rate appeared to be
roughly linear on the fluence, although some sample-to-sample variation was observed up
to a factor of 2. Unpublished data at −60 ◦C yielded similar conclusions.
6.3 Estimation of required cooling temperatures
DDD value calculated above is equivalent to 5 × 108 cm−2 at 100 MeV monochromatic
proton fluence using Eq. (5.2). For each fluence level, dark count rates of each silicon
SPAD model is averaged out for −60 ◦C and −86 ◦C characterizations. Using the linear
relationship found in Fig. 6.2, the dark count rate of each model is estimated for 5×108 cm−2
fluences for both temperatures. Taking into account the exponential dependence of the dark
count rate on temperature [70], as shown in Fig. 6.3, the estimated dark count rates for
each model for both temperatures are curved-fitted by the exponential function to estimate
the SPAD temperatures required to reach the dark count rates of 200, 660, and 2000 Hz
at the end of the 2-year mission. The results are listed in Table 6.1. However, sample-
to-sample variations and uncertainty of radiation environment prediction [56] necessitate
a reserve factor. The detector design needs to be able to cope with a factor of 3 worse
dark count rates than predicted, which requires cooling by an additional ≈15 ◦C. Thus, to
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guarantee dark count rate below 2000 Hz per SPAD, the detector module should be capable
of cooling SLiK SPADs to −45 ◦C and C30921SH to −65 ◦C. At these temperatures,
afterpulsing probability of SLiK and C30921SH is projected to stay below 1% [70]. These
temperatures are achievable with thermoelectric cooling and forced-convection air radiator
at room temperature [98]. However, cooling below −65 ◦C may require a more complex
design, possibly using a compact Stirling cooler.
Figure 6.3: Dark count rates of irradiated silicon SPADs as a function of oper-
ating temperatures (Reprinted from [70]).
Table 6.1: Estimated SPAD temperature required to reach various dark count
rates after 2 years in orbit.
SPAD model 200 Hz 660 Hz 2000 Hz
SLiK −57.4 ◦C −42.7 ◦C −29.1 ◦C
C30921SH −81.5 ◦C −65.1 ◦C −49.8 ◦C
SAP500 −95.6 ◦C −77.1 ◦C −59.9 ◦C
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6.4 Conclusion
In summary, commercial thick-junction silicon SPAD chips from Excelitas appear to be a
suitable choice for the ISS segment, given that Space-QUEST experiment can tolerate dark
count rate of 1000–2000 Hz per detector. The detector module will need to use a custom
thermal design and electronics [52, 98]. If a sufficient cooling system cannot be provided,
implementing additional radiation damage mitigation methods can be considered. Anisi-
mova et al. [70] showed that thermal annealing of irradiated silicon SPADs at up to 100 ◦C
can repair some of the damage, resulting in up to 6.6-fold dark count rate reduction. In
the following chapter, a new mitigation method called laser annealing is presented to heal
radiation damages and achieve near pre-radiation dark count rates. The method is inspired
by a separate study showing that a certain power range of focused laser illumination can
lower non-irradiated SPAD dark count rates by up to 5.4 times [110].
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Chapter 7
First Laser Annealing Experiments
This chapter is organized with the content from [111]. See Statement of Contributions.
7.1 Introduction
As described in Section 5.3.1 and Section 5.4.1, laser annealing is performed on nine irradi-
ated Single-Photon Avalanche photoDiode (SPAD) (Excelitas SLiK, Excelitas C30902SH,
and Laser Components SAP500S2). Laser annealing successfully decreases the dark count
rates in all nine irradiated SPAD samples by a factor ranging from 5.3 to 758 when oper-
ated at −80 ◦C. Dark count rate reductions due to laser annealing can exceed those from
thermal annealing. Notably, dark count rates are reduced even when laser annealing is
applied to SPADs that were already thermally annealed. Laser annealing also affects other
important photon counting parameters including photon detection efficiency, timing jitter,
and afterpulsing probability, but the operation of quantum communications applications
should not be significantly influenced by these changes.
7.2 Test samples
Some of Excelitas C30902SH, Excelitas SLiK, and Laser Components SAP500S2 devices
used in the previous study [70] in Section 5.4.1 are tested. These were chosen as they are
the only commercially available thick-junction SPAD models (thick-junction SPADs have
higher detection efficiencies at the quantum signal wavelength around 785 nm, which makes
them the most appealing for use on a quantum satellite receiver). All SPAD samples are
hermetically sealed in glass-window packages and the photosensitive areas of C30902SH
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Table 7.1: Summary of detector samples, applied radiation, previous thermal
annealing, and measured results of laser annealing. The detectors are referred to
by the given sample IDs throughout the paper. The highest reduction factor is the ratio
between the reference dark count rate before any laser annealing and the lowest dark count
rate after laser annealing—the corresponding laser power for this is also given. We include
typical pre-radiation dark count rates of each model under the same bias and temperature
conditions [70, 99].
Sample ID
106 MeV
proton
fluence
(cm−2)
Equivalent
time in
600 km
polar
orbit
(months)
Thermal
annealing
procedure
Dark count rate at −80 ◦C
Annealing
power
(W)
Vexcess
(V)Before
(Hz)
Lowest
after
(Hz)
Highest
reduc-
tion
factor
Typical
for pre-
radiation
(Hz)
C30902SH-1 109 6 None 347 2.3 150 0.8 14
C30902SH-2 109 6 None 363 2.64 137
}
∼ 5
1.5 14
SLiK-1 108 0.6 2 h @ 100 ◦C 6.71 0.16 41.7 1.4 14
SLiK-2 108 0.6 2 h @ 100 ◦C 2.19 0.42 5.3 0.8 14
SLiK-3 4× 109 24 4 h @ 80
◦C,
2 h @ 100 ◦C
43.1 2.09 21 1.4 14
SLiK-4 109 6 None 192 8.3 23 1.0 20
SLiK-5 4× 109 24a 3 h @ 80
◦C,
2 h @ 100 ◦C
447 58 7.7 1.0 20
SAP500S2-1 4× 109 24 4 h @ 80
◦C,
2 h @ 100 ◦C
1579 2.08 758

< 1
1.4 20
SAP500S2-2 108 0.6 2 h @ 100 ◦C 213 1.66 128
∼ 2
1.6 20
a Bias voltage is applied during proton irradiation.
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and SAP500S2 are 500 µm in diameter, while that of SLiK is 180 µm in diameter. Ta-
ble 7.1 presents the details of previous radiation testing and thermal annealing procedures
performed on the test samples. These samples were stored in a −20 ◦C freezer before laser
annealing experiments to prevent any spontaneous annealing at room temperature.
For every detector, the dark count rate after irradiation (and any thermal annealing)
is so high that the devices are saturated when operating at room temperature. For this
reason, all samples are characterized at −80 ◦C in the cold-temperature characterization
apparatus. However, unlike the other devices, each Excelitas SLiK comes with a built-in
thermistor and thermoelectric cooler (TEC), allowing additional testing to be performed
in-situ in the laser annealing apparatus at an operating temperature of −30 ◦C.
The samples are held in detector modules, as shown in Fig. 5.6, with R1 replaced by
403 kΩ. (See Section 4.3 for the description of how the detector module works.) The dark
count rate, relative changes in photon detection efficiency (Pde) (and absolute Pde for SLiKs
characterized at −30 ◦C), and afterpulsing time distribution through the analysis of detec-
tion event times produced by a time-tagging unit with 156.25 ps resolution (UQDevices
16-channel model) are measured. Timing jitter (∆tjitter) is measured using an oscilloscope
(LeCroy 640Zi).
7.3 Experimental setup
Laser annealing apparatus
Figure 7.1(a) shows the laser annealing apparatus, which improves upon the laser annealing
experimental setup of Ref. 110. Our apparatus allows us to laser-anneal SPADs, take
pictures of their active areas, measure their dark count rates and Pde, and scan Pde across
the entire active area to check whether laser annealing has produced any local damage.
Our setup consists of a single-mode (SM) continuous-wave 808 nm signal laser (QPho-
tonics QFLD-808-100S), and one multi-mode (MM) 0−30 W continuous-wave 808 nm an-
nealing laser LD2 (Jenoptik JOLD-30-FC-12). The 808 nm wavelength is selected for the
annealing laser to ensure that SPADs fully absorb photons in the depletion region and
generate heat energy1. The output power from the weak coherent continuous-wave light
1Typical depletion region thickness of thick-junction silicon SPADs is 20−150 µm [95]. At 300 K, if
the wavelength is too long (>1100 nm), the SPADs transmit most photons. If the wavelength is too short
(<500 nm), most photons are absorbed only at the surface of the SPADs [112]. Absorption depth of 808 nm
photons, at which the light intensity has fallen to 1/e of the initial value, is ∼10 µm [112].
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780 nm signal laser
(pulsed)
VOA
SM
50:50
SM
O/E converter Oscilloscope
Time-tagging unit
 or oscilloscope
Cooling chamber at −80 °C
(b)
Detector module
VOA
MM
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SM
808 nm signal laser
(continuous-wave)
808 nm annealing laser
(continuous-wave)
LD1
LD2
PM1
PM2
SA
(a)
Camera
90: 10
Detector module
z y
x
Time-tagging unit
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LD3
Fiber
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Power
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90:10 (reflection:transmission)
non-polarizing beamsplitter
VOA
SA
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diode (LD)
Figure 7.1: Experimental setup. (a) Setup for laser annealing and characterization at
room temperature. (b) Setup for characterization at −80 ◦C. In (a), LD1 and LD2 are
overlapped such that high-power laser from LD2 can be focused on the active area by
focusing LD1 onto it. LD1 is also used for measuring SLiKs’ photon detection efficiency.
The detector module is mounted on an XYZ translation stage, which can move between
the laser setup and camera. The free-space portion of the setup is enclosed in a light-tight
box. In (b), diverging weak coherent pulses are applied on SPADs for full characterization.
SM: single-mode optic fiber; MM: multi-mode optic fiber; O/E: optical-to-electrical.
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source (LD1) is calibrated in the following way to apply the mean photon count rate of
48.8 kHz at the sample’s active area. The pigtail of the signal laser LD1 is connected to
a 90:10 fiber beamsplitter (Thorlabs FC780-90B FC). One output port is connected to a
power meter (PM1; OZ Optics POM-300-VIS) to continuously monitor the output power
from LD1, while the other output port is connected to two attenuators in series. First,
by monitoring the optical power at the detector module, a screw attenuator (SA) is set
to reduce the laser power to the nW range. The ratio of the power measured at PM1
and that at the detector module gives SA’s attenuator amount. Then, a digital variable
optical attenuator (VOA) (OZ Optics DA-100-35-770/830/850-5/125-5-40-LL) is set be-
tween 40−50 dB to bring the laser illumination down to the single-photon level. Now,
the mean photon count rate at the detector module can be controlled by monitoring PM1
and VOA’s attenuation amount. The attenuated continuous-wave laser beam is sent to a
collimation setup in SM fiber, then collimated by an aspheric lens (Thorlabs C280TME-B)
and reflected off two dielectric mirrors (Thorlabs BB1-E03-10) to provide four degrees of
freedom for alignment. It then goes through 90:10 (reflection:transmission) non-polarizing
beamsplitter (Thorlabs BS029 90:10), a mechanical shutter (Thorlabs SH05 with Thorlabs
SC10 controller), a focusing lens (Thorlabs C220TME-B), and reaches the SPAD.
The continuous-wave annealing laser LD2 is coupled to a 200 µm diameter core MM fiber
(RPMC Lasers OAL-200/220/245). The annealing laser beam is collimated by an aspheric
lens (Thorlabs C220TME-B) and reflected at the 90:10 non-polarizing beamsplitter. The
beams of the annealing and signal lasers overlap so that both can be focused on the same
spot. A power meter (PM2; Thorlabs S142C) located in the transmission arm of the
annealing laser allows us to accurately control the annealing power at the SPAD.
A camera (Canon 7D with macro lens MP-E 65 mm f/2.8 1–5x) and a light-emitting-
diode photography illuminator are mounted beside the laser setup. The XYZ translation
stage, on which the detector module is mounted, enables us to move the samples between
the laser setup and the camera.
Cold-temperature characterization apparatus
A separate apparatus, shown in Fig. 7.1(b), is built to measure the dark count rate, relative
changes in Pde, ∆tjitter, and afterpulsing probability at −80 ◦C. The low temperature sig-
nificantly suppresses thermally excited dark counts [70]. The detector module is extracted
from the laser annealing apparatus and placed inside a cooling chamber (Delta Design
9023) at −80 ◦C.
The apparatus necessary to measure the absolute Pde cannot fit in the cooling chamber;
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consequently, we measure Pde relative to a reference by sending diverging weak coherent
pulses (WCPs) from the end of a fiber onto the SPADs. Each SPAD’s active area is suf-
ficiently small that it receives approximately uniformly distributed light intensity, despite
the overall Gaussian profile of the incident optical mode. We use a 780 nm laser LD3 (Pi-
coQuant LDH 8-1) as the WCP source, pulsed at 40 MHz with full width at half maximum
(FWHM) of 188 ps. The laser pulses are split by a 50:50 fiber beamsplitter (Thorlabs
FC780-50B-FC). One output port is connected to a digital variable attenuator (OZ Op-
tics DA-100-35-770/830/850-5/125-5-40-LL) and sends the laser pulses through a fiber to
the SPADs placed inside the cooling chamber. The other output port is connected to an
optical-to-electrical converter (LeCroy OE455, DC–3.5 GHz) and the oscilloscope. Having
oscilloscope access to both input laser pulses and output avalanche pulses allows us to
measure ∆tjitter (which requires using a pulsed laser, as opposed to continuous-wave such
as LD1).
7.4 Laser annealing process
To perform laser annealing, the detector module is positioned to ensure that the high-power
annealing laser beam is focused on the active area of a SPAD. (The FWHM beam diameter
is 92 µm.) Next, the desired annealing power is set by monitoring the power meter PM2
with the shutter closed. We then open the shutter and laser-anneal the SPAD for 60 s,
immediately afterwards closing the shutter and letting the device cool down to the room
temperature for another 60 s. We then perform characterization.
For most samples, we perform multiple stages of laser annealing and characterization,
with laser power increased between each stage. To determine whether this stepwise laser
annealing process has any additional effects, we apply only a single-shot power of 1 W to
SLiK-4 and SLiK-5 for comparison (1 W is chosen based on observed results of the first
three SLiKs to ensure a dark count rate reduction). Similarly, C30902SH-2 is laser-annealed
at two specific powers, chosen based on C30902SH-1’s observed results.
The temperatures reached by the SPADs during laser annealing are of interest because,
for some temperature ranges, alternative heating methods may be more practical to im-
plement on a satellite (e.g., using an electric heater). We can measure the temperature of
SLiK samples using their integrated thermistor (mounted on the cold plate of TEC, close
to the SPAD). The temperature of SLiK-1’s thermistor is recorded at the end of the 60 s
exposure, for most annealing powers. According to our measurements (see Chapter A),
the thermal resistance between the photodiode chip and thermistor is negligible; thus, the
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temperature reading by the thermistor provides an accurate reading of the temperature
reached by the SPAD during laser annealing.
7.5 Characterization
All nine samples’ parameters are measured at −80 ◦C in the cold-temperature characteriza-
tion apparatus, while SLiKs are also characterized at −30 ◦C (reached using their built-in
TECs) in the laser annealing apparatus.
Breakdown voltage. Vbr is measured by observing avalanche pulses on an oscilloscope.
As Vbias is gradually increased from 0 V, avalanche pulses begin to appear when Vbr is
reached. We estimate the accuracy of this Vbr measurement to be better than ±0.3 V.
This measurement is performed at the start of every full characterization. Both C30902SH
samples and SLiK-1, SLiK-2, and SLiK-3 are subsequently biased 14 V above Vbr, whereas
SLiK-4, SLiK-5, and both SAP500S2 samples are biased 20 V above Vbr. The choice of
Vexcess is arbitrary; however, we change Vexcess values to explore its effects on laser-annealed
SPADs.
Dark count rate. Dark counts are recorded with the time-tagging unit for 500 s. The
mean dark count rate is calculated by dividing total number of recorded dark counts by
500 s. We define the dark count rate reduction factor as the ratio between the reference
mean dark count rate before any laser annealing and the mean dark count rate after
laser annealing. Some of the samples were already thermally annealed in another experi-
ment [70]; thus, having further dark count rate reduction in those samples imply that laser
annealing mitigates proton radiation damage better than thermal annealing.
Photon detection efficiency. To measure relative Pde at−80 ◦C in the cold-temperature
characterization apparatus using diverging WCPs, we take the mean count rate over 500 s.
Following the completion of laser annealing and measurements of the two C30902SH sam-
ples, it was discovered that the output power of LD3 varies over time. As the C30902SH
samples have undergone laser annealing, measurements unfortunately cannot be retaken.
Consequently, for all other samples, we normalize the count rate by the average laser
power (measured at the oscilloscope immediately before and after a measurement). We
then calculate the relative change in Pde by subtracting the mean dark count rate and then
normalizing against the initial photon count rate.
For SLiKs we determine the absolute Pde while operating at −30 ◦C in the laser an-
nealing apparatus. The continuous-wave signal laser LD1 is applied, with its photon rate
calibrated via loss and laser power measurements in our optical setup. Then, we measure a
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Figure 7.2: Measuring the timing jitter of SAP500S2-2. We measure the relative
time difference between laser pulses and SPAD output pulses over at least 105 output
pulses, and plot these as a histogram. ∆tjitter is the width of the pulse peak.
mean count rate over 500 s using the time-tagging unit. Subtracting the mean dark count
rate from the mean count rate and dividing the difference by the calibrated input photon
rate gives Pde.
Testing within the laser annealing apparatus also allows us to scan Pde at various
points over the active area of the SLiK devices. We measure the signal laser’s illumination
spot size using a beam profiler—the beam waist is ∼20 µm (FWHM). We thus step the
translation stages in 10 µm increments, such that Pde of the active area is fully and tightly
covered. We scan a square region that covers the active area, with appropriate pauses at
each step for vibration dissipation.
Timing jitter. To measure ∆tjitter, both the laser output pulses and the SPAD’s avalanche
pulses are connected to the oscilloscope. We then plot a histogram of the relative time
difference between these two signals over at least 105 avalanche pulses (see example in
Fig. 7.2), and measure the FWHM.
Afterpulsing probability. Afterpulsing probability is calculated from time-stamped
counts. We typically use dark counts, but if the dark count rate for an SPAD is too low,
we use a dim light pulsed at 100 Hz to facilitate a measurement. The extra light increases
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the background count rate by a few Hz (otherwise, the background count rate tracks the
SPAD’s dark count rate), and does not influence the afterpulsing distribution. A detailed
description of how the afterpulsing analysis software operates is explained in Section 4.4.4.
For a quantum communications protocol such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD),
the afterpulsing peak, shown in Fig. 4.8, contributes to the Quantum Bit Error Rate
(QBER), and it is thus desirable to remove the peak by extending the dead time out to the
flattened region [84, 85, 95]. In practice, this can be performed by discarding all counts
before the end of a user-selected dead time in post-processing [113, 114] or by using an
active quenching circuit [115]. Such additional dead time, however, limits the maximum
detection rate [84, 86]. Because long distance transmissions reduce the expected detection
rate [47], the amount of additional dead time could be optimized to balance the QBER
with the detection rate to maximize the final key rate [99, 113, 114].
7.6 Results and Discussion
Right half of Table 7.1 summarizes the laser annealing results for the maximum dark count
rate reduction. Detailed results for each SPAD model follow.
Excelitas SLiK. Figure 7.3 shows characterization results for the five SLiKs. The max-
imum dark count rate reduction ranges from 1.3 to 10 times when operating at −30 ◦C,
and from 5.3 to 41.7 times at −80 ◦C. Importantly, the SLiKs that were previously ther-
mally annealed exhibit further dark count rate reduction after laser annealing. SLiK-4
and SLiK-5, after a single exposure at 1 W, still show a significant decrease in the dark
count rate. 1 W may not give the highest reduction factor but it shows that the single
exposure and stepwise annealing processes induce comparable dark count rate reduction
factors. Thus, the stepwise process can be used on a SLiK to find the optimal annealing
power and a single exposure at this power on other SLiKs under similar conditions should
achieve comparable dark count rate reduction.
Pde of each SLiK did not change significantly, and a spatial scan in Fig. 7.4 shows that
photosensitivity across the active area is not altered by high-power laser annealing. Vbr
and ∆tjitter also do not fluctuate much after laser annealing. SLiK-4’s and SLiK-5’s ∆tjitter
are lower than those of other SLiKs due to the 6 V difference in Vexcess [95].
The afterpulsing probability results are interesting. Proton radiation mainly causes
displacement damage in SPADs [116]. Highly energetic protons displace atoms from their
lattice structures, producing extra energy levels in the bandgap (defects). The defects
near the mid-bandgap contribute to thermally generated dark counts, while those near the
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Figure 7.3: Characteristics of SLiK SPADs after laser annealing. Points at zero
power show the initial characteristics before laser annealing. The samples have been char-
acterized at −30 ◦C after every annealing stage (data represented by points without lines),
and additionally characterized at −80 ◦C after some of the steps (points connected with
lines). The dark count rate is averaged over 500 s only once, but it is known to follow the
Poisson distribution so the standard deviation is simply the square root of the mean value.
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Figure 7.4: Detection efficiency scan of SLiK-1. (a) Prior to annealing, and (b) after
3.3 W annealing. The spatial profile is essentially unchanged, proving that focused high-
power laser illumination does not degrade photosensitivity in the active region of the SPAD
for the power range we tested. The plots at the top are the cross sections at Y = 0.
conduction band are called trap levels that cause afterpulses. After proton irradiation,
SLiKs’ dark count rates are significantly increased but the afterpulsing probabilities are
still low [70], implying that the displacement damage by 106 MeV protons at the depletion
region mainly produces thermal generation centers [116]. Although the dark count rate is
reduced in all samples after laser annealing, the afterpulsing probability increases in most
of them. This also implies that laser annealing not only removes thermal generation centers
but also simultaneously creates extra trap levels. The increased afterpulsing probability
can be handled by imposing additional dead time (see Section 7.5).
When the high-power laser is applied to SLiK-1, its thermistor temperature rapidly
increases in the first 30 s. The temperature continues to rise at a slower rate in the second
half of the 60 s exposure until it reaches the peak temperature in the last 2–3 s. The
peak thermistor temperature at each annealing power is plotted in Fig. 7.3. The SLiKs we
have tested experience a significant dark count rate reduction at annealing power of 1 W.
Assuming the thermal resistance between SLiK-1’s thermistor and the SPAD is negligible
(see Chapter A), 1 W of power anneals the SPAD at peak temperature of ∼90 ◦C. The peak
temperature is reached only in the last few seconds, but we speculate that it determines
the dark count rate reduction factor. If this is the case, our results imply that laser-
annealing of irradiated SLiKs at the peak temperature of ∼90 ◦C for 60 s leads to a higher
dark count rate reduction than thermally annealing them at 100 ◦C for two hours [70] (see
Table 7.1). The observed discrepancy in the dark count rate reduction suggests that light
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Figure 7.5: Progressive destruction of SLiK-1. The sample is exposed to laser power
of (a) 3.5 W, (b) 5.2 W, (c) 7.7 W, and (d) 9.0 W. The photodiode stopped working as a
single-photon detector after annealing at 3.5 W. From 3.6 W, the gold plating surrounding
the active area of the SPAD begins to degrade and flow into the active area at higher
powers. The package window becomes foggy from 4.9 W. The SPAD chip starts shifting
downwards from 6 W and has moved by ≈30 µm overall.
may play a greater role than simply providing the heat energy in improving irradiated
SLiKs’ performance.
For SLiK-1, we continue to test at higher powers. Fig. 7.5 shows the gradual change
in the appearance of SLiK-1’s active area. Fig. 7.5(a) does not show any visible physical
destruction, but the device has already stopped working as a single-photon detector after
annealing at 3.5 W. In Fig. 7.5(b)–(d), damage becomes visible. It appears that an epoxy
layer between two ceramic plates has boiled and condensed on the package window, causing
it to become opaque. We did not remove the blurry detector window because it may change
illumination power calibration and cause oxidation due to exposure of the hermetically
sealed package (filled with nitrogen gas) to the atmosphere. (SLiK’s detailed mechanical
structure can be seen in Fig. 5 of Ref. 117. Clear images of C30902SH’s physical destruction
are shown in Fig. 4 of Ref. 110.)
Excelitas C30902SH. Figure 7.6 shows characterization results for the two irradiated
C30902SHs. Similar to the SLiKs, C30902SH-1 is laser-annealed and characterized at mul-
tiple stages, but C30902SH-2 is treated at two specific powers, chosen based on C30902SH-
1’s results. The samples experience the maximum dark count rate reduction of 150 times
and 137 times at −80 ◦C. They recover typical pre-radiation dark count rates. Again, the
stepwise process does not show any additional improvements on the dark count rate when
compared to the single exposure process.
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Figure 7.6: Characteristics of C30902SH and SAP500S2 SPADs after laser an-
nealing. Points at zero power show the initial characteristics before laser annealing. Each
point shows a measurement after successive laser illumination power. The dark count rate
is averaged over 500 s only once, but it is known to follow the Poisson distribution so the
standard deviation is simply the square root of the mean value.
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Relative Pde measurement for C30902SHs is inaccurate due to the fluctuation of the
laser output power (which we normalize out for measurements of the other devices; see
Section 7.5). Due to the variation observed, it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Vbr and
∆tjitter do not change significantly. Afterpulsing probabilities are negligible in C30902SHs,
which also implies that thermal generation centers are the main contributors to dark counts
after irradiation. We stop testing these C30902SHs before they show signs of damage—
testing non-irradiated C30902SHs at higher powers was done in Ref. 110.
Laser Components SAP500S2. Unlike SLiKs, SAP500S2s cannot withstand high-
power illumination. SAP500S2-1 and SAP500S2-2 fail to work as single-photon detectors
after laser annealing at 1.6 W and 1.8 W, respectively. Both SAP500S2s (see Fig. 7.6)
exhibit the maximum dark count rate reduction just before they stop working as a single-
photon detector (the reduction factor of 758 times for SAP500S2-1 and 128 times for
SAP500S2-2). SAP500S2s have the highest dark count rate after proton irradiation [70]
and such high reduction factors prove that laser annealing is more effective than thermal
annealing. The lowest dark count rates after laser annealing (≈2 Hz) are at typical pre-
radiation values.
Relative Pde varies for different laser annealing powers. Unlike C30902SH measure-
ments, the photon count rate here is normalized to the laser source’s average power for
every characterization, so the observed variation is real. To avoid Pde fluctuation and
achieve sufficiently low dark count rate, one should perform laser annealing around 1 W.
Vbr seems to decrease slightly, and then increase just before each SAP500S2 stops
working as a single-photon detector. An increase in Vbr may be an indication that the
maximum laser annealing power is reached. ∆tjitter remains almost constant and it is low
compared to C30902SHs because SAP500S2s are biased an extra 6 V (for a Vexcess = 20 V)
above a significantly lower Vbr.
While SLiKs and C30902SHs display a marginal increase in afterpulsing probability
as the laser power increases, the afterpulsing probability is reduced in SAP500S2s (after-
pulsing probability did not change much after proton irradiation [70]). Although these
reductions are insignificant compared to the highest dark count rate reduction factor in
Table 7.1, the results imply that laser annealing reduces both trap levels and thermal
generation centers at the same time. The overall results suggest that the materials used
to manufacture SAP500S2s are more susceptible to the high energy damages induced by
protons and the annealing laser.
Although high-power laser exposure can be helpful for reducing SPAD dark counts, it
also has the potential to damage components, such as classical photodiodes and pinholes,
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in quantum communication systems [118]. Such changes to the apparatus may invalidate
assumptions—most notably, within the security analysis for implementations of QKD,
which could lead to exploitable side-channels. However, having a reduction in dark counts
does not benefit the eavesdropper because QKD security proofs attribute all losses and
errors to the eavesdropper while assuming Bob’s apparatus to be error-free [119].
The laser annealing apparatus could be reduced in complexity for implementation as
part of a satellite payload; however, a high-power laser is still required. Further research
is needed to understand the physical phenomena behind the dark count rate reduction,
and determine whether the specific properties of laser light are fundamentally necessary to
achieve the gains observed here.
7.7 Conclusion
Our experimental results demonstrate that laser annealing can remedy calculated low Earth
orbit radiation damage for three different types of SPADs. The dark count rate of all sam-
ples, including the samples that were previously thermally annealed, is greatly reduced.
Several of them have their dark count rates recovered to typical pre-radiation levels. This
suggests that laser annealing is a more effective method than thermal annealing. The
observed fluctuations in other photon counting parameters should not degrade the perfor-
mance of quantum communication applications. We speculate that laser annealing heals
the crystal lattice structure defects, thermal generation centers in particular, created by
proton radiation. The following chapter explores different laser annealing methods to try
to understand the mechanisms of the laser annealing effect and directly compares the
reference, post-irradiation and post-laser-annealing dark count rates of silicon SPADs.
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Chapter 8
Second Laser Annealing Experiments
8.1 Introduction
In our second round of laser annealing experiments, we explored different aspects of laser
annealing. First, by performing full cycle of characterizations and tests from pre-radiation
state to post-irradiation to laser annealing procedure, the dark count rate can be directly
compared to verify whether it returns to pre-radiation values. Second, different laser
annealing methods are explored in an attempt to identify the causes of the laser annealing
effect and to seek methods that would give a similar dark count rate reduction factor with
lower optical power. Next, one sample is annealed with forward-bias current for 1 hour
at a time to check if it can also reduce the dark count rate. Finally, a few samples are
characterized several times over ≈60 hours after each laser annealing exposure to observe
if the effect is permanent.
8.2 Test samples
The conditions of 12 samples are described in Section 5.3.2 and Section 5.4.2. Of 12
samples that were irradiated at TRIUMF in Table 5.3, 10 samples, excluding LC-J and
LC-L, are tested. LC-A, LC-C, LC-E, LC-I, and LC-K are laser-annealed in the same
way as the initial laser annealing: applying the high-power continuous-wave laser for 60 s.
LC-G is laser-annealed for 180 s continuously. LC-B, LC-D, and LC-H are laser-annealed
in duty cycle mode, in which the high-power laser is modulated by an optical chopper
with 50% duty cycle at 1.5 kHz, placed before the beam splitter in Fig. 7.1(a). LC-F is
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annealed by forward-bias current. In addition, LC-M, LC-N, and LC-O that were irradi-
ated by Prof. Alexander Ling’s group at the National University of Singapore (NUS) are
also laser-annealed using the 60 s illumination method and are tested for permanency by
characterizing them every 2 hours for the first 6 hours and then every 8−13 hours for the
following two days, after each laser annealing exposure.
8.3 Experimental setup
Experimental setups used for laser annealing and characterization are the same as Fig. 7.1.
8.4 Characterization
The cold-temperature apparatus shown in Fig. 7.1(b) is used to characterize the detectors
at 22 ◦C, −20 ◦C, and −80 ◦C.
Breakdown voltage. Breakdown voltage (Vbr) is measured by observing avalanche pulses
on an oscilloscope as described in Section 7.5. However, instead of having a fixed Vexcess,
each detector has a different value as it was chosen in the initial characterization performed
by NUS in Table 5.3 and Table 5.6 .
Dark count rate. Dark counts are recorded with SR-400 photon counter from Stanford
Research Systems for 600 s. The mean dark count rate is then calculated by dividing the
total count by 600 s. The dark count rate reduction factor is defined as the ratio between
the reference mean dark count rate before any laser annealing and the mean dark count
rate after laser annealing.
Mean avalanche pulse amplitude. Mean avalanche pulse amplitude is measured over
2000 pulses on an oscilloscope with 5 mV trigger level to quickly check if a detector is
saturated or not.
Avalanche pulse amplitude distribution. 20000 avalanche pulses’ amplitudes are
categorized in a histogram to confirm detector saturation with 5 mV threshold level.
8.5 Results and Discussion
Table 8.1 shows proton radiation damage level for the samples treated with 60 s continuous
laser annealing. A sample from each fluence group is selected to check if the annealing effect
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is applicable to all fluence groups. Figure 8.1 shows Vbr and dark count rate measurements
after each annealing power. Laser annealing was not performed at higher power because
LC-A, LC-E, LC-I, and LC-K became foggy after 1200 mW exposure. For operations
at 22 ◦C and −20 ◦C, LC-A, LC-C, LC-E, and LC-I reach similar dark count rates after
800 mW or 1000 mW annealing, but the dark count rate of LC-K cannot be reduced to
that level. Therefore, it is recommended to laser-anneal detectors before exceeding total
radiation damage of 4×109 proton fluences @ 100 MeV. For −80 ◦C, the dark count rate of
every sample after laser annealing is below 0.1 Hz, so the detectors should be laser-annealed
at any time for better performance.
Table 8.2 summarizes the results of full radiation and laser annealing cycle. The dark
count rate of all samples are reduced to a level close to pre-radiation values. Figure 8.2
proves that the dark count rate has truly returned to pre-radiation values because the
shape of the pulse distribution is no longer distorted. For these samples, 800 mW would
be the best choice for 22 ◦C and −20 ◦C, while 1200 mW is good for −80 ◦C.
Table 8.1: Characteristics of SAP300s tested for 60 s continuous laser annealing.
ISS orbit is 400 km low Earth orbit with the inclination angle of 51.64°, while QEYSSat
orbit is a heliosynchronous 600 km noon-midnight orbit. 1.8 mm aluminum shielding is
chosen for the ISS orbit, while 10 mm aluminum shielding is selected for the QEYSSat
orbit.
Module
Identifier
Target fluence
@ 100 MeV
(p/cm2)
Equivalent mission
duration at ISS
orbit (months)
Equivalent mission
duration at
QEYSSat orbit
(months)
LC-A 1.66× 108 3 1
LC-C 3.32× 108 6 2
LC-E 6.73× 108 12 4
LC-I 2× 109 36 12
LC-K 4× 109 72 24
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Figure 8.1: Breakdown voltage (Vbr) and dark count rate measurement after each
60 s laser annealing cycle as a function of the optical power. Vbr is measured at the
beginning of every characterization after laser annealing. Data at 0 mW are measurements
after proton irradiation.
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Table 8.2: Characteristics of SAP300s tested for 60 s continuous laser annealing.
Module
Identifier
22 ◦C −20 ◦C −80 ◦C
LC-A
Pre-radiation
DCR (Hz)
10518 - -
Post-radiation
DCR (Hz)
79808 2677 3.34
Lowest DCR
after laser
annealing(Hz)
13832 206.7 0.075
Corresponding
optical power
(mW)
800 800 1200
LC-C
Pre-radiation
DCR (Hz)
15243 - -
Post-radiation
DCR (Hz)
84170 2159 2.01
Lowest DCR
after laser
annealing(Hz)
12630 144.1 0.017
Corresponding
optical power
(mW)
1000 1000 1000
LC-E
Pre-radiation
DCR (Hz)
14612 - -
Post-radiation
DCR (Hz)
119525 3854 0.87
Lowest DCR
after laser
annealing(Hz)
18326 209.9 0.037
Corresponding
optical power
(mW)
800 800 1200
LC-I
Pre-radiation
DCR (Hz)
13632 - -
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Post-radiation
DCR (Hz)
130997 6149 3.9
Lowest DCR
after laser
annealing(Hz)
15466 201 0.062
Corresponding
optical power
(mW)
1000 1000 1200
LC-K
Pre-radiation
DCR (Hz)
15107 - -
Post-radiation
DCR (Hz)
96935 20249 103.8
Lowest DCR
after laser
annealing(Hz)
20768 294.3 0.098
Corresponding
optical power
(mW)
1000 1000 1200
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8.6 Exploring different laser annealing methods
Two additional laser annealing methods are compared to the initial 60 s continuous laser
annealing method. One is 180 s continuous laser annealing, and the other is 50% duty cycle
pulses for 60 s. The 180 s laser annealing method should reach similar peak temperatures
as the initial method because it was reached in the last few seconds of 60 s, as mentioned in
Section 7.6. Thus, if the dark count rate reduction is due to the thermal effect, it may have
a similar dark count rate reduction as 60 s laser annealing method. If electrons play an
important role, the dark count rate may possibly be reduced further. The purpose of 50%
duty cycle method is the opposite of 180 s method. The objective is to maintain the same
peak temperature, while only 50% of photons are absorbed to limit electron excitation.
The optical chopper’s frequency of 1.5 kHz is the fastest frequency I could get, but it is
necessary to get modulation frequency >1 MHz such than heat dissipation is slower than
laser exposure on the sample.
Figure 8.3 shows Vbr and dark count rate measurements. All three samples’ dark
count rates are recovered close to their pre-radiation levels. For characterizations at 22 ◦C
and −20 ◦C, the maximum dark count rate reduction occurs at the same optical power
(800 mW) for 60 s and 180 s laser annealing methods. This result seems to indicate that
the laser annealing effect is due to local thermal annealing. However, the 180 s laser
annealing method has a higher dark count rate reduction from 267 mW to 800 mW which
implies that there could be other effects. If a high-power laser cannot be equipped on a
satellite, 180 s laser annealing at an optical power between 267 mW and 800 mW would be
better than the initial 60 s laser annealing.
For 50% duty cycle method, the lowest dark count rate is recovered at 2000 mW. This
may mean that electrons actually play a role in dark count rate reduction but this power is
equivalent to average power of 1000 mW. The optimal average power for the highest dark
count rate reduction is the same as that of 60 s laser annealing method. The same peak
temperature may have been reached at 2000 mW because it became foggy after 2400 mW
exposure. (Both samples for 60 s and 180 s laser annealing methods became foggy after
1200 mW.) Therefore, it is necessary to measure the temperature of the photodiode chips
for better analysis for finding the causes of the laser annealing effect. Regardless of the
causes of the laser annealing effect, the duty cycle method is not a suitable method in
space because it requires much higher optical power.
Table 8.3 summarizes the best dark count rate reduction occurrences. Once again,
Fig. 8.4 proves that the dark count rates are indeed recovered because the pulse shapes
show that the dark count rates are not saturated anymore.
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Figure 8.3: Breakdown voltage (Vbr) and dark count rate measurement after
each optical power for different laser annealing methods comparison. Vbr is
measured at the beginning of every characterization after laser annealing. Data at 0 mW
are measurements after proton irradiation. 60 s laser annealing data are from LC-E, 180 s
laser annealing data from LC-G, and 50% duty cycle method data from LC-H.
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Table 8.3: Characteristics of SAP300s tested comparing different laser annealing
methods.
Module
Identifier
22 ◦C −20 ◦C −80 ◦C
60 s
continuous
laser
annealing
(LC-E)
Pre-radiation
DCR (Hz)
14612 - -
Post-radiation
DCR (Hz)
119525 3854 0.87
Lowest DCR
after laser
annealing(Hz)
18326 209.9 0.037
Corresponding
optical power
(mW)
800 800 1200
180 s
continuous
laser
annealing
(LC-G)
Pre-radiation
DCR (Hz)
15617 - -
Post-radiation
DCR (Hz)
109819 3356.7 5.8
Lowest DCR
after laser
annealing(Hz)
14388.9 180 0.062
Corresponding
optical power
(mW)
800 800 1000
50% duty
cycle laser
annealing
method
(LC-H)
Pre-radiation
DCR (Hz)
16262 - -
Post-radiation
DCR (Hz)
103143 5284.5 58.3
Lowest DCR
after laser
annealing(Hz)
14796.2 182.9 0.087
Corresponding
optical power
(mW)
2000 2200 2000
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50% duty cycle method showed higher dark count rate reduction factor than 180 s
method. Thus, LC-B and LC-D are laser-annealed with 50% duty cycle method and the
results are compared to those of LC-A and LC-C. Based on the results of LC-H, LC-B and
LC-D are only laser-annealed at 1600 mW, 2000 mW, and 2400 mW, where the highest dark
count reduction occurred previously. Figure 8.5 shows characterization results. Similar to
LC-H, the dark count rates of LC-B and LC-D are the lowest when the average optical
power is 800 mW or 1000 mW. All of them were not saturated after proton irradiation, so
the dark count rate reduction is real.
Exploring different methods seems to imply that the main cause of laser annealing effect
is localized thermal annealing. Thus, in order to verify this hypothesis, LC-F is annealed
by forward-biased current only. The results are discussed in the following section.
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Figure 8.5: Breakdown voltage (Vbr) and dark count rate measurement after each
optical power for comparing 50% duty cycle method and 60 s laser annealing
method. Vbr is measured at the beginning of every characterization after laser annealing.
Data at 0 mW are measurements after proton irradiation. LC-A and LC-C are laser-
annealed by 60 s laser annealing method, while LC-B and LC-D are laser-annealed by 50%
duty cycle method. (LC-A, LC-B) and (LC-C, LC-D) pairs have the same proton radiation
damage.
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8.7 Forward-current annealing
LC-F is annealed for 1 hour at each forward-bias current. A current source is directly
connected to the sample and an ammeter and a voltmeter are also connected.
Figure 8.6 shows that the Vbr remains constant after annealing at different powers and
that the dark count rate gradually decreases. After 135 mW was consumed at the diode
for an hour, the dark count rate is halved compared to the reference post-irradiation value
at 0 mW. (The forward-bias current stopped flowing during annealing at 180 mW.) This
dark count rate reduction is interesting because it implies that electrons may play a role
in the laser annealing effect.
Figure 8.7 compares the dark count rate of LC-E, LC-F, LC-G, and LC-H that were
damaged by the same displacement damage dose. It shows that forward-bias current has
steeper dark count rate reduction before it stopped working, although laser annealing of
three different methods can reach much lower dark count rates. It is feasible that LC-F is
thermally annealed at this power, so thermal images of it are taken shortly after forward-
bias current annealing began and shortly before it ended for 147 mW. Figure 8.8 shows
that the aluminum package is heated up to ≈33 ◦C, but when Single-Photon Avalanche
photoDiode (SPAD) temperature plot in Fig. 7.3 is extrapolated to ≈33 ◦C, the correspond-
ing laser power should be somewhere in the range between 250−300 mW. Given this, the
forward-bias current annealing method shows better dark count rate reduction that laser
annealing at those optical powers, which implies that an electric current also significantly
contributes to the dark count rate reduction. However, it is also feasible that the thermal
resistance between the photodiode chip and the aluminum package is high such that the
temperature of the photodiode chip is much higher and that the thermal annealing effect
could be the dominant factor. However, I think the thermal resistance is negligible as the
device is very small.
For the next rounds of experiments, it would be interesting to compare the radiation
damage mitigation of thermal annealing and forward-bias current annealing to observe
which method performs better. While running forward-bias current annealing, the samples
should be stored in a cold temperature chamber to exclude any thermal annealing effects.
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Figure 8.6: Breakdown voltage (Vbr) and dark count rate measurement after each
forward current annealing. The forward current was controlled in this measurement,
and total power consumption at each forward current is calculated and used as x-axis.
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Figure 8.7: Dark count rate measurement comparison of all different methods.
LC-E, LC-G, and LC-H are annealed by a high-power laser, while LC-F is annealed elec-
trically. LC-F is annealed for 1 hour and LC-H is illuminated by the high-power laser for
60 s.
(a) A few minutes after annealing began. (b) After 1 hour
Figure 8.8: Thermal images of LC-F during forward-bias current annealing at
147 mW. Images of the photodiode chip could not be taken because a glass window in
front blocks light for imaging. As a result, photos are taken from the side. (FLIR E60 is
used for the images.)
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8.8 Permanence testing
It is investigated whether the laser annealing is effective on samples with low proton radia-
tion damage and whether the effect is permanent when stored under 3 different conditions:
LC-M at room temperature with bias off, LC-N at room temperature with reverse-bias on,
and LC-O at −20 ◦C with bias off. After each laser annealing exposure, the samples are
stored in their conditions for next 58-59 hours. For the first six hours, the samples are
characterized every two hours, then twice per day for the rest with the storage interval
varying between 8-13 hours.
LC-M and LC-O, respectively, have 1000 Hz and 2000 Hz dark count rates increase after
proton irradiation. Their dark count rates are minuscule so their states should be similar
to those of to non-irradiated samples, so we expected these samples to also experience dark
count rate reduction in 400−800 mW range, as shown in [110]. However, they both have no
significant changes <1 W. On the other hand, LC-N has higher proton radiation damage
and it shows a similar behaviour as the one in [110]. The dark count rate increases after
200 mW, and then it is 1.6 times lower than the reference dark count rate after 600 mW.
These results lead to a conclusion that laser annealing should be performed when the
dark count rate is significantly increased. Fluctuations in the dark count rates during
permanence test are mainly caused by the operating temperature fluctuation.
For LC-N and LC-O, Vbr increases after 1.2 W laser annealing. In [111], it was shown
that when Vbr begins to increase, the SAP500s stopped working if laser-annealed at 1400−1600 mW
optical power. SAP300s are manufactured from the same company and these samples also
became foggy when Vbr increased. All samples from NUS became foggy after 1.2 W ex-
posure, shown in Fig. 8.10, so we stopped laser annealing at 1.2 W. The mean pulse
amplitude remains fairly constant for the most of the time. Laser annealing effect appears
to be permanent when stored in any of three different conditions.
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Figure 8.9: LC-M, LC-N, LC-O characterization results. The errorbars for the dark
count rate represent one standard deviation of the value following Poissonian distribution.
Inset of the dark count rate is data points for first 8 hours. For dark count rate measure-
ment, a time-tagging unit (UQDevices 16-channel) was planned to be used, but it could
not pick up the small avalanche pulses of LC-M and LC-N, so a counting device to Stanford
Research Systems SR 400 two channel gated photon counter, operating at 10 MHz with
threshold value at 40 mV, was used instead for these samples. The overvoltage of LC-O
is higher than the other, so we could collect counts using the time-tagging unit, so we
proceeded to use it just for LC-O. However, after 200 mW annealing and six hours into
permanence test, we noticed that the time-tagging unit’s discriminator functions poorly,
causing the count rate to fluctuate. From this point, we used SR 400 even for LC-O. This is
why Figure 8.9 is missing first few dark count rate data points for LC-O. Characterization
results of LC-M, LC-N, and LC-O after proton irradiation are provided in Table 5.6.
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Figure 8.10: Pictures of LC-M, LC-N, LC-O. (a) LC-M prior to laser annealing, (b)
LC-M after 1.2 W, (c) LC-N prior to laser annealing, (d) LC-N after 1.2 W, (e) LC-O prior
to laser annealing, (f) LC-O after 1.2 W.
8.9 Conclusion
The second round of laser annealing of irradiated SAP300s showed that the dark count rate
can be recovered to the level close to the pre-radiation values. This is the first full cycle
of radiation tests and laser annealing for directly comparing the dark count rates of pre-
radiation, post-radiation, and post-laser-annealing. For operations at between −20 ◦C and
22 ◦C, the best laser power is 800−1000 mW and SAP300s should be laser annealed before
the accumulative radiation damage is below 4 × 109 proton fluences @ 100 MeV proton
energy. For operations at −80 ◦C, SAP300s can be laser-annealed any time using the
optical power at 1200 mW. For new annealing methods in space, the forward-bias current
annealing and 180 s continuous laser annealing method could be considered. From our tests
with different approaches - forward-bias current annealing, 180 s continuous laser annealing,
and 50% duty cycle method - it appears that electrons may play a role in reducing the dark
count rate but more testing will be required for finding the exact causes of laser annealing
effect. Finally, our observations indicate that the laser annealing improvement seems to be
permanent.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Outlook
In this Thesis, I presented the results of four projects I participated in. In Chapter 5,
I calculated radiation dose for ISS orbit and performed proton radiation test on Laser
Components SAP300s. We found that the dark count rate increase and proton fluences
have a linear relationship and that after staying at the simulated ISS orbit for more than
6 months, SAP300s are all saturated at room temperature.
In Chapter 6, I estimated the radiation dose inside an ISS pressure vessel to study the
feasibility of using silicon Single-Photon Avalanche photoDiode (SPAD)s for Space-QUEST
experiment for 1-year mission time. We showed that Excelitas SLiK, Excelitas C30902SH,
and Laser Components SAP500 should be able to be cooled down to −45 ◦C, −65 ◦C, and
−75 ◦C, respectively, to reach the dark count rate of 2000 Hz.
In Chapter 7, research in laser annealing of irradiated silicon SPADs was performed.
Our results demonstrated that high-power continuous-wave laser annealing for 60 s can
remedy simulated low-Earth-orbit radiation damage for three different types of SPADs:
Excelitas SLiK, Excelitas C30902SH, and Laser Components SAP500. The dark count rate
of all samples, including the samples that were previously thermally annealed, is greatly
reduced. Several of them have their dark count rates recovered to typical pre-radiation
levels.
In Chapter 8, research in laser annealing of irradiated SAP300s was performed. Having
the pre-radiation characterization results, unlike the previous project, we could show that
the dark count rate is indeed recovered to the pre-radiation level after laser annealing.
We also explored additional annealing methods and showed that laser annealing for 180 s
and forward-bias current annealing can be investigated further for use in space if it is not
possible to equip a satellite with a high-power laser (≥1 W). We also showed that laser
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annealing is a permanent effect. However, more tests need to be performed to find the
exact causes of the laser annealing effect.
Thermal annealing had been performed on silicon SPADs before [66, 69, 70, 100] to
counteract the radiation damage. As far as we know, it is the first time to perform high-
power laser annealing on silicon SPADs for quantum communications to reduce the back-
ground noise, produced by radiation damage. Either method can lengthen the lifespan of a
quantum satellite. However, there are still two limitations in our laser annealing research.
One is that the radiation dose calculation using SPENVIS has a factor of 2−3 error when
compared to real space radiation environment [105]. The other is the statistical fluctua-
tions between samples. Only one or two samples with the same radiation dose were tested
and shown in this thesis. Thus, more samples with the same radiation dose need to be
tested for statistical variations research. To resolve the first limitation, the University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champagne, the University of Waterloo, and NASA are working together
to launch a cube satellite to test both thermal annealing and laser annealing on silicon
SPADs in low Earth orbit [91]. This project will verify whether laser annealing is indeed
more effective at mitigating radiation damage in space and whether it can be practical
over thermal annealing using a built-in thermoelectric cooler. If this project concludes
that laser annealing is a better method to implement for future quantum satellites, more
samples can then be tested to resolve the statistical variation limitation. Furthermore, the
project can quantify the lifespan of the satellite when radiation damage mitigation meth-
ods are implemented. In the meantime, studies on the laser annealing effect mechanisms
can be investigated further.
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Appendix A
Laser Annealing Temperature Measurement
We measure the thermal resistance between the Single-Photon Avalanche photoDiode
(SPAD) and the thermistor of SLiK-2, in order to estimate temperatures achieved by
laser annealing. The thermistor mounted on the cold plate of the thermoelectric cooler
(TEC) (see Fig. 5 in Ref. 117) allows us to measure the cold plate’s temperature during the
laser annealing process. Thus, by finding the thermal resistance between the SPAD and
the cold plate, we can predict the actual temperature produced by each annealing power.
Alternatively, measuring Vbr provides an indirect measure of an SPAD’s temperature.
This method is convenient because we can easily measure Vbr with the experimental setup.
Before measurements, we find the relationship between Vbr and temperature by setting the
TEC controller to temperatures from −30 ◦C to 20 ◦C in 10 ◦C increments and measuring
Vbr at each point. The fit line in Fig. A.1 shows that Vbr linearly depends on temperature.
For the thermal resistance measurement, we turn off the TEC current but keep mea-
suring thermistor temperature. We also vary the bias voltage over the range of 50 V to
90 V above Vbr at room temperature. Such high bias voltages cause a high dark count
rate, resulting in a constant current flow in the circuit. Consequently, the voltage across
the SPAD is approximately Vbr because of continuous quenching process, and Vbr increases
at high bias voltages owing to higher heat dissipation. When applying each bias voltage,
we wait for the thermistor temperature to stabilize, and measure the voltage across the
1 kΩ readout resistor in the passive quenching circuit (replacing R2 in Fig. 5.6 for more
accurate avalanche current measurement). From this voltage value, we deduce Vbr and the
SPAD’s power dissipation. Power dissipation of the SPAD is calculated by multiplying the
avalanche current (on the order of a few hundred µA) and Vbr. Using the linear relation-
ship found in Fig. A.1, we find the SPAD’s temperature and compare it to the thermistor
temperature. The temperature difference divided by the SPAD’s power dissipation gives
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Figure A.1: Breakdown voltage (Vbr) of SLiK-2 at various temperatures. The
relationship between Vbr and temperature is linear. The coefficient of determination, R
2,
is 0.99994.
Table A.1: Measurement of thermal resistance between SPAD and cold plate.
Vbias
(V)
Vbr
(V)
∆T
(◦C)
Power
dissipation
(mW)
Thermal
resistance
(K W−1)
340 294.65 −0.16 33.4 −4.8
350 295.05 −0.44 40.5 −10.8
360 295.82 0.11 47.4 2.3
370 296.74 0.98 54.3 18.0
380 297.10 0.54 61.5 8.8
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us the thermal resistance. Table A.1 summarizes thermal resistance test results. Although
the results are somewhat noisy, making it difficult to find the exact thermal resistance, it
is clear that the thermal resistance is sufficiently small that the thermistor temperature
approximately matches that of the SPAD itself. This assumption is used to estimate laser
annealing temperature in conjunction with SLiK-1’s thermistor temperature measurements
during laser annealing procedure.
Our passive quenching circuit is designed to have the Single-Photon Avalanche photoDi-
ode (SPAD) reverse-biased only, but if it can be forward-biased during the laser annealing
procedure, the temperature of the SPAD can be directly explored by checking the IV curve.
The forward bias current follows
IF ∼ e
qVd
kBT (A.1)
where q is the electric charge, Vd the diode voltage, kB the Boltzmann constant, and T
the diode temperature. By keeping the same forward diode voltage for different laser
illumination powers and measuring the corresponding output forward current, the diode
temperature (T) can be accurately found.
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